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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The ‘European defence’ idea is as old as the project of European integration itself.1 
Following a number of long-winded adventures the European defence project took shape of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1998 which has been becoming a still more 
important component of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security (CFSP). This 
intergovernmental initiative representing a new dimension of European integration2 is surely a 
milestone on the integration journey on which ESDP is as important as the single market or the 
monetary union.3 In relation to the ESDP (and the whole CFSP) EU member states have decided 
to extend – though on the intergovernmental level – the scope of the Union’s action to areas 
which had previously been under exclusive control by nation states, in spite of a similar military 
and political cooperation within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance for over fifty years. 
ESDP can be said to be a part of European political integration while coming in reaction to the 
end of the Cold War and the subsequent hot wars on the European continent throughout the 
1990s, wars that Europe was unable to face with adequate reaction. 
In spite of its large population and great economic power (the EU is the largest economic 
superpower in the world and the most populous entity in the West) Europe remains a ‘political 
dwarf’, as claimed by Nicole Gnesotto.4 So far, Europe has not been able to look after its own 
security and take up responsibility for what is happening on the European continent, to say 
nothing of the world. 
ESDP could thus be described as an effort at the emancipation of Europe so as to leave 
behind Europe’s legacy of the Cold War and start intervening in military conflicts and crises on 
the continent or even beyond, in areas under the aegis of Europeans such as in Africa, with the 
new joint military instruments made operable only through cooperative effort (such as armed 
forces specialisation). ESDP is to allow the Union to undertake military operations without first 
US and, later on, also the NATO assistance: so far, the ESDP has been linked and 
complementary to NATO, as part of a larger package of ‘burden sharing’.5
                                                          
 These operations shall 
be undertaken by the European Union in line with its values, such as the promotion of human 
rights, democracy, political and cultural pluralism, and peace and prosperity on the European 
continent and in the world. They shall be carried out according to the Union’s principles which 
1 Lefebvre, M.: Les perspectives de la défense européenne. In: Montbrial, T. (ed.): Ramses 2004, IFRI-Dunod, Paris 
2003, p. 88. 
2 Editorial in: Mezinárodní politika, No. 3, 2000, p. 3. 
3 Brimmer, E.: Conclusion. In: Brimmer, E .(ed.): The EU’s Search for a Strategic Role. Center for Transatlantic 
Relations, The Johns Hopkins Un., Washington 2002, p. 159. 
4 Gnesotto, N.: Introduction. In: Gnesotto, N. (ed): EU Security and Defence Policy: First Five Years. Institute for 
Security Studies, Paris 2004, p. 35. 
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include the emphasis on international law, multilateralism, co-operation and assistance. Last but 
not least, ESDP is also geared towards stimulating European governments to pay more attention 
to their own defence – and increase their defence spending – to end their security dependence on 
the United States.  
The ESDP has had a brief but dynamic past record6
                                                          
 with a number of achievements. 
Even though the thoughts of an autonomous European defence were considered utopian during 
the Cold War era and found resonance in only some, predominantly French, political circles, the 
end of the Cold War transformed them into a necessary reality.  
ESDP itself has evolved from the previous European Security and Defence Identity – the 
‘NATO’s European pillar’ – and has been accepted by all EU Member States in the end, chiefly 
due to the fact that it was Great Britain who co-sponsored the effort along with France after 
Tony Blair became the UK Prime Minister. Great Britain’s own perception of its role in ESDP is 
that of a driving force. The USA has declared its support to the ESDP project to a certain extent 
and under certain conditions. ESDP is provided for in the primary law of the European Union 
and has its own institutions, along with its slowly developing Rapid Reaction Force and Battle 
Groups. First military operations in the Balkans and Congo have been undertaken under the 
ESDP leadership and EU flag even though all of them relied on NATO military and planning 
capacities, except for the Congo operation. ESDP has gained wide support from the general 
public across EU states with people preferring ESDP rather than NATO and reliance on the US.7  
  And yet, despite all these indisputable achievements the ESDP is still tied by substantial 
constrictions, symptomatic more or less for the whole CFSP or European political integration in 
general. To a large extent, the implementation of ESDP targets is a compromise struck among 
the EU Member States and is hostage to the unity of their positions on foreign policy and 
security issues which is very hard to achieve, especially in issues that are on top of the national 
foreign policy list. Each of the EU states has projected its national foreign policy and security 
preferences into the implementation of ESDP goals and each of these EU states has had a 
different perception of the need for autonomous European defence and European political 
emancipation or the role of NATO and the USA in European security. Last but not least, the 
ESDP project has been discredited by the ongoing unwillingness by EU Member States to spend 
(even slightly) more on defence because of their strained budgets having to bear up the welfare 
state burden. On the one hand, Europe wishes to take on some more responsibility for its 
defence and become a heavier global actor, on the other hand, however, Europeans are not 
willing to spend enough money on that goal (in fact, of all the EU countries, only Great Britain, 
6 Gnesotto (ed.), 2004, p. 11.  
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France and to a lesser extent Germany have armies that could be used in modern operations). In 
general, many ESDP and CFSP aspects are dealt with on the theoretical level, ‘on the paper’, but 
the execution falls behind the plan, due to a number of reasons. 
The ESDP project is not carried out in a vacuum even though that might sometimes 
seem to be the case. It seeks to react to the transformation of the security milieu after the Cold 
War.8 New, ‘asymmetric’ or ‘non-state’ threats have emerged upon the disappearance of the 
communist threat. Terrorism now represents the primary threat for the West, as the September 
11 2001 attacks and other later attacks in Madrid and London confirmed. Along with these 
changes, the understanding of security and security policy have also been transformed into much 
more complex notions, including a broad range of both military and non-military instruments. 
This has had a crucial impact on the security and defence policies of European states as new 
threats have been defined, helped to legitimise the very existence of ESDP (the EU as a civilian - 
and future military – power aspiring to become a universal security structure), and somewhat 
challenged, in the long term, the so far unswerving position of NATO as an exclusively military 
organization.9 These changes in the security milieu have met with even more avid response on 
the other side of the Atlantic: the US security policy has been adapted and rationalized, though in 
a different way and through different methods of first choice than in Europe. The very definition 
of threats, however, is the same for Europe and the USA.  
These ESDP developments have been closely linked to the development of transatlantic 
relationship and the transatlantic security link. The transatlantic link was the axis of Western 
security throughout the Cold War era, largely retaining this role in the post-Cold War context as 
the community of values and fundamental interests still means that Europe and North America 
need each other as allies. A debate has started, however, on a substantial transformation of the 
transatlantic relationship in relation to the building of a political union and CFSP (and ESDP) as 
well as in the context of a changed US foreign and security policy after September 11, 2001 which 
has brought unilateralism and non-reliance on Europe and NATO and, eventually, caused a 
rupture in the West over Iraq. The two sides of the Atlantic are said to be mowing away from 
each other.10 The USA has become less interested in Europe and it is in this respect that 
Americans welcome the European efforts to take over from them the responsibility for Europe’s 
own security. At the same time, Washington – along with some European capitals – is concerned 
about the EU being overambitious in terms of the common EU’s foreign and defence policy by 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 Eurobarometer 62, Autumn 2004, www.europa.eu.int. 
8 Cameron, F.: The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union CFSP. Sheffield University Press, Sheffield 
1999, p. 69. 
9 Van Ham, P.: Security and Culture, or why NATO Won’t Last. In: Security Dialogue, No. 4, 2001. 
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seeking to establish ESDP as a defence union, making the EU the world’s leader and a global 
power. The potential (and still more or less theoretical) translation of these ambitions into reality 
might dramatically change or damage, depending on the point of view, the transatlantic 
relationship and the position of NATO, dominated by Americans.11 It might also threaten the US 
interests and the dominance of the USA in the world.  
  
This paper seeks to analyse the current and future effect ESDP might have on the 
transatlantic relationship while trying to find out what form of ESDP might disrupt the 
transatlantic partnership in the future and what form would, on the contrary, be beneficial. This 
paper aims to prove that ESDP is perfectly compatible with the transforming transatlantic 
relations, providing specific conditions are met, which will be specified in the below text. This 
claim is not made because of the fact that the currently minimalist ESDP is not in conflict with 
the transatlantic relations and the role of NATO today as this might change over time, depending 
on further ESDP developments. This assumption is rather made on the basis of a successful 
ESDP being able to bridge the present ‘mental gap’ between Europe and the USA stemming 
from their different military potentials and their willingness to use military force.  
The paper will also aim at proving that the existence and development of ESDP are 
inescapable – though problematic – because the very transatlantic relation must become more 
balanced to benefit all stakeholders and maintain the transatlantic link for the future since the 
importance of this relation is unquestionable for the whole Western community. The primary 
focus of the future transatlantic relations in security and defence shall be on the EU-US 
relationship whose goal should not be to become absolutely conflict-free at any costs. The focus 
shall therefore shift from NATO, even though, from the practical point of view, NATO might 
seem indispensable today. We do not dispute NATO’s role in a mutual defence relation. As an 
organisation though, NATO has been losing its political raison d’etre from the long-term 
perspective, we believe, because of the ongoing political integration of the EU and the recently 
changing security milieu and due to the transformation of US foreign and security policy.  
The paper builds on a top-down critical analysis method. First of all, we focus on general 
issues such as the changing security environment and the post-Cold War developments in the 
security policy of Europe and the United States. A case study comparing the European Security 
Strategy with the US National Security Strategy is used to illustrate this. This case study is 
followed by an assessment of post-Cold War transatlantic relations, along with an outline of the 
ESDP developments so far, follows, tracking the progress both on paper and in practice, 
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focusing on the key aspects of ESDP. Another section of the paper deals with European defence 
industry which is a marginal topic in respect of ESDP but plays an important role in the broader 
security context of our paper. These introductory – rather descriptive – chapters serve as a 
backdrop to some more specific issues such as the positions of key nations on ESDP. We will 
focus on Great Britain, France, Germany and the USA. These actors’ attitudes towards ESDP are 
absolutely crucial for this paper: the analysis of these common and divergent positions will allow 
us to predict future ESDP developments and their impact on transatlantic relations as it is states, 
in the first place, that determines the nature of ESDP and the transatlantic relation. This analysis 
takes account of the long-term and continuous positions of these states represented by their 
governments. Where appropriate, however, some attention is also given to other actors, such as 
opposition parties etc. And, finally, the concluding synthesis seeks to answer the question asked 
at the beginning: How and under what conditions will ESDP influence transatlantic relations? 
 
Before starting with the analysis, we shall turn to the state-of-the-art debate on this topic. 
Since ESDP and post-Cold War transatlantic relations are extremely topical and fast evolving 
issues, there is quite little consensus among experts on these themes. There is practically no 
disagreement among the authors about the fact that some European defence policy is definitely 
needed today to remove the burden from the US shoulders and that a transatlantic defence 
alliance must be retained. Little consensus, however, is found in what the defence policy should 
look like and whether it should go hand in hand with an overall political emancipation of Europe 
or rather with the effort to make the EU a global player acting independently from or even 
contrary to the USA. There is a whole range of views on, for example, the future of NATO: 
some authors, in minority now, argue that NATO is irreplaceable, being the only effective 
embodiment of the transatlantic defence relations which is seriously threatened by an extensively 
evolving ESDP. Other experts perceive NATO as an obsolete ‘Cold War relic’12
                                                          
 which is not to 
today’s security reality and lags behind the transforming transatlantic relations and the changing 
US security policy. (Security is a complex notion: it is necessary to combine and complement 
military and non-military instruments as well as internal and external security policies.) These 
authors see the Union or the ESDP, operating with a wider range of instruments than NATO, as 
the only chance to carry out a European security policy in the context of recent developments. 
There is no consensus among authors on what the security and defence relations between 
Europe and the USA should be like in the future: similar to today’s relations, i.e. security 
interdependence even though Europe is rather dependent on the US in this model; or different, 
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with Europe and the USA becoming equal and independent partners who may ‘quarrel’ from 
time to time, after all. A note must be made here that the views of these experts are often out of 
sync with the views of politicians and administrations of their respective countries. Yet, there are 
clear exceptions to this: French authors unanimously pushing for ‘European solutions’ 
and authors from the ‘New Europe’ countries – including from the Czech Republic – clinging to 
the current status of NATO because, being ‘orthodox Atlanticists’, they see NATO as the corner 
stone of security of their countries which have only recently joined NATO and have still been 
influenced by their deeply troubled past.13 Despite some distrust by US administrations of ESDP, 
there are many American authors who rather welcome ESDP and its further progress, including 
the development of a ‘new, balanced transatlantic partnership’14. This is either because they 
recognise European ambitions as legitimate, or because of the need to ‘disregard’ Europe as such, 
in the spirit of the new Republican ‘isolationism’. In general, ‘non-believers’ in ESDP and a 
possible equality in the EU-US relationship pointing out the need for NATO retaining its current 
role, are ‘closer to the practice’, perceiving NATO as indispensable at this moment in time and in 
practical terms. On the contrary, ESDP supporters who believe that an equal security partnership 
between the EU and the USA is the only feasible one for the future are closer to academia and 
theoretical thinking.  
Little has been written on the very topic of ESDP effects on the wider transatlantic 
relations. Given the complexity of the issue examined, we had to rely on a synthesis of a broad 
spectrum of publications on (current and future) transatlantic relations in general and ESDP in 
particular, along with the individual positions of states on security and defence. We also studied 
publications analysing the theoretical aspects of security policy and the current trends. As things 
move very quickly in this area, we had to follow the press and news servers as well. A number of 
publicly available sources were relied on, too, such as EU summit communiqués etc.  
We have taken four publications as the main reference documents for the analysis of 
facts, definitions and views. Two of them – one by a French and the other by a Czech author – 
deal with the ESDP development and main features (Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003)15 or the 
positions of key countries on ESDP (Khol, 2002),16 both being quite detailed. The other two 
publications are written by American authors, one by a US thin-tank CSIS17
                                                          
 focussing on the past 
and present developments in the transatlantic relations (Balis, Serfaty, 2004)18 and the other by a 
13 Bugajski, J., Teleki, I.: Washington’s New European Allies: Durable or Conditional Partners? The Washington 
Quaterly, No. 2, 2005. 
14 Layne, 2001, p. 11. 
15 Dumoulin, A., Mathieu, R., Sarlet,, G.: La PESD. Bruylant, Brussels 2003. 
16 Khol, R. (ed): ESDP: Národní perspektivy. ÚMV, Praha 2002. 
17 Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
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Johns Hopkins University team, dealing with the way how the ESDP effects the transatlantic 
relations (Brimmer, 2002).19 The last-mentioned volume was the major source of information for 
us in terms of our assessment of the future ESDP scenarios and the likely impact on the 
transatlantic relations. Publications stressing the importance of building an autonomous 
European defence (Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001; Layne, 2001),20 pointing out to the 
weakening political role of NATO (Van Ham, 2000),21 and the need for a balanced transatlantic 
relationship (Brimmer, 2002; Sweiss, 2003)22 were of crucial guidance to us as well. On the other 
hand, we had to stand in critical opposition to some Czech authors, namely to Jiří Schneider 
and Michael Žantovský23 representing a thought community insisting on the indispensability of 
NATO as the single framework for transatlantic relations. As much as ESDP is concerned, we 
also had to somewhat relativise the Robert Kagan’s famous Power and Weakness.24  
Let us conclude this introductory section with the definitions of several key notions used 
throughout our paper. By the frequently used term ‘Europe’ we mean a political area of Western 
Europe embracing EU Member State and candidate countries and the European NATO 
members. For the purposes of this text, the transatlantic relationship is reduced to security and 
defence cooperation (we refer to a transatlantic link), in spite of the need to take the political 
dimension (i.e. the politically balanced relationship between the EU and the USA) into account as 
well. Security and defence policy shall mean a policy providing for the security of a given entity. 
Nowadays, however, this is not limited to the defence of a state territory by force only and to the 
reliance on armed forces and intelligence but it increasingly covers out-of-area military or other 
operations25 or international cooperation, in line with respective foreign policies. When speaking 
about European defence or the European Union security and defence policy (the EU being composed of 
nation states with their own defence policies), we refer to the latter security policy category only, 
i.e. to operations abroad.26 The European security and defence policy (ESDP) is understood very 
specifically, as an EU project or policy implemented after 1998 only, despite occasionally dealing 
with the future models of ESDP as well.  
 
                                                          
19Brimmer, E. (ed.): The EU’s Search for Strategic Role. Center for Transatlantic Relations. Johns Hopkins 
University, Washington 2002.  
20 Andréani, G., Bertram, C., Grant, C.: Europe’s Military Revolution. Centre for European Reform, London 2001; 
Layne, C.: Death Knell for NATO? CATO Institute Policy Analysis, Washington 2001.  
21 Van Ham, P.: Europe’s Common Defense Policy: Implications for Transatlantic Relationship. In: Security 
Dialogue, No. 2, 2000.  
22 Schweiss, C.: Sharing Hegemony: Future of Transatlantic Security. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3, 2003.  
23 Schneider, J., Žantovský, M.: NATO and the Greater Middle East: A Mission to Renew NATO. Pass Policy Paper 
No. 1, Prague 2003. Schneider, J.: Budoucnost transatlantických vztahů z pohledu České republiky. In: Mezinárodní 
politika, No. 4, 2005.  
24 Kagan, R.: Power and Weakness. Policy Review, No. 113, 2002. 
25 Cameron, 1999.  
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2. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY CULTURE OF EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
2.1. Changing understanding of security and security policy after the Cold War  
 
This paper deals with the post-Cold War period which has brought about a fundamental 
change in the security milieu and, sooner or later, the reactions by members of the Western 
community. The vacuum created by the sudden disappearance of the dominant threat from the 
Communist camp has been filled by ‘asymmetric threats’ posed by non-state actors who did 
operate prior to the end of the Cold War but were not paid much attention to and were only 
recognised by the tragic attacks of September 11, 2001. The transformed security environment 
has necessitated modifications in the strategic thinking of both Americans and Europeans.  
Traditionally, security thinking distinguished between external security (reactions to 
threats from abroad) and internal security (reactions to threats coming from within). A distinction 
used to be also made between hard security (reaction to a military threat by a state by using military 
instruments) and soft security (reaction to internal and cross-border threats by non-state entities by 
using both military – hard power27- but also non-military – soft power – instruments).28 Because of 
the presence and nature of the new, asymmetric threats it is not tenable to treat these as separate 
categories since they are intertwined: all security threats must be approached in a complex way 
today.29 In other words, post-Cold Ward security is a complex issue covering even those areas 
that had previously not been included in the security category.30 
 
2.2. Comparing the European security strategy and the US National Security Strategy 
  
The European Security Strategy and the United States National Security Strategy provide 
the best illustration of the new European and American perception of threats and the adequate 
answers to these threats.  
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) was drafted in 
2002. In spite of the NSS being a standard document produced by every US administration, the 
NSS of the Bush administration, drafted after the 9/11 attacks, holds a privileged position as it is 
considered to be an embodiment of a long-term US foreign and security policy after the Cold 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26 Krahmann, E.: Conceptualizing Security Governance. In: Cooperation and Conflict, No. 1, 2003. 
27 Fatič, A.: Conventional and Unconventional – Hard and Soft Security: The Distinction. South-East Europe 
Review, No.3, 2002, pp. 93-98.  
28 Joseph Nye defines the combination of soft power and hard power methods as a ‘carrot and stick’ method. (Nye, J.: 
The Paradox of American Power. Oxford Un. Press, Oxford 2003, p. 10). 
29 Van Ham, 2001, p. 396. 
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War. NSS has identified three major threats: terrorism, regional conflicts and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.31  
The European Security Strategy (ESS), subtitled as ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World,’ 
was drafted to serve as a long-term strategic conception of the EU Member States (not only) for 
the purposes of CFSP. The ESS was endorsed at the December 2003 summit in Brussels. The 
ESS identifies the same threats as the NSS but adds another two: failed states and organised 
crime.32 The ESS is certainly document providing a fair reflection of today’s security reality. The 
strategy, however, is a hurried document – it is not clear how the ESS is going to be implemented 
as it is a joint strategy of twenty five states.33 But this aspect should be left aside for the moment.  
Europe and the USA agree, in principle, on the definition of threats. They are, however, 
at times in disagreement over the way of facing them. Europe is generally in favour of an 
‘effective multilateralism’34 building on the primary role of international organisations (the UN in 
particular) which provides more space for Europe to exert its influence.35 This method is built on 
an assumption that diplomatic instruments must be used to muster support for the use of force 
(and possible military solutions) from as many states as possible to make this use of force 
legitimate and to ensure that this solution complies with international law. Europe also argues 
that, besides force, prevention through humanitarian and economic aid as well as through wider 
co-operation (soft power) can be effective in fighting terrorism where no negotiation is possible.  
The United States, on the contrary, generally favour preventive or pre-emptive actions taken 
without any previous diplomatic negotiations and recourse to international law.36 This strategy 
grows from a conviction that the absolute national sovereignty concept in the UN Charter is an 
antiquated notion and that immediate interventions are necessary to safeguard human rights and 
democracy even at the price of an armed conflict. (This strategy is undoubtedly built on the high-
level US armed forces allowing for fast and precise actions without substantial harm to civilian 
populations.) Moreover, the traditional US Cold War doctrine of deterrence is not effective in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
30 Cf. the concept of ‘securizitation’ – Waever, O.: Securitization and Desecuritization. In: Lipschutz, R. (ed.): On 
Security. Columbia University Press, New York 1995.  
31 Weiss, T.: Evropská bezpečnostní strategie ve světle Národní bezpečnostní strategie USA. In: Integrace, 
27/9/2004. European Security Strategy, 2003, s.3-4;  National Security Strategy of the USA, 2002, part III, IV,V 
32 Ibid. 
33 Grevi, G.: No Strategy Without Politics. Ideas Factory – European Policy Centre, Brussels, 2004.  
34 Weiss, 2004. European Security Strategy, 2002, s. 9. 
35 Multilateralism is an idea once promoted by the United States (by presidents Wilson and Roosevelt) as an 
alternative to the European Concert that lead the world into two world wars.  
36 Weiss, 2004. Pre-emptive war is what happens when a state targets an enemy that represents an imminent threat of 
attack. The Six-Day War was a pre-emptive war. 
Preventive war is what happens when a state targets an enemy before they can become an imminent threat of attack. The 
attack on Pearl Harbor was a preventive war. 
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fighting terrorism.37 We must note that European countries do not reject the pre-emptive action 
doctrine as such but they understand it in the spirit of the ‘Annan Doctrin’ of humanitarian 
intervention,38 i.e. as a military intervention by the international community in order to prevent a 
humanitarian disaster or a massive violation of human rights, such as in Kosovo in 1999. It is 
clear, however, that the war in Iraq, for example, has gone beyond this concept of humanitarian 
intervention: Iraq was not a failed-state type of a threat as defined under the ESS – and failed 
states are to be assisted, on top of that. Instead, it was an implementation by the USA of a regime 
change doctrine39 which does not see the threat in failed states that have to be assisted but rather in 
the rogue states whose regimes need to be overthrown by military force.  
  The US National Security Strategy is based on the notion that internal and external or 
hard and soft security are both part of a larger whole and that the USA, with its military 
capacities, would be ‘better off’ in exporting the effort to safeguard its internal – or soft – security 
(e.g. the fight against terrorism) abroad. This means that an internal/soft security threat is reacted 
to by using hard security/power instruments.40 Europe, on the other hand, makes a distinction 
between external security (through national defence or NATO and/or ESDP) and internal 
security (the fight against terrorism using intelligence within national borders or EU-level 
coordination such as in the spheres of police cooperation or an anti-terrorist coordinator).  
  The USA has a wealth of both hard power/security and soft security instruments, Europe 
(or the EU) has a wide range of purely soft power instruments: Europe enjoys much more trust 
in the world due to the weight of a joint position of many countries and the ‘power of an 
example,’41 it has a much greater potential to negotiate and much greater potential to help and 
cooperate. What is positive about the transatlantic link is the mutual inspiration in this respect – 
in communicating with their US ally, European states realise the need for more hard power while 
the USA recognise the many benefits of soft power thanks to Europe.42 It is therefore quite 
paradoxical that Europe used to be the greatest power in terms of hard security while the USA 
exerted most of its influence as a soft power.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 Föhrenbach, G.: Security Through Engagement: The Worldview Underlying ESDP. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p.15. 
38 A concept promoted by Bernard Kouchner, the chief of the Médecins Sans Frontières, in the 1980s.  
39 Courmont, B.: Washington et le monde. In: Boniface, P. (ed.): L’Année stratégique 2004. IRIS, Paris 2003.  
40 Shapiro, J., Suzan, B.: The French Experience of Counter-terrorism. In: Survival, No. 1, 2003, pp. 79-80.  
41 Nye, 2003, p. 9. 
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3. TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AFTER COLD WAR  
 
3.1. New reality for an ‘Old Relationship’ 
 
The transatlantic relations have been going through a time of significant change caused by 
the above-mentioned transformation of the strategic milieu after the Cold War and the 9/11 
attacks. It is necessary to note that pessimism is currently prevailing in terms of the future of the 
Atlantic alliance, mainly due to the Iraq crisis.43 More and more voices point out that the two 
sides of the Atlantic are moving apart from one another and that common values no longer have 
much weight in a world of increasingly divergent interests and growing disagreements. All of this 
goes hand in hand with increased anti-Americanism in Europe and anti-Europeanism in 
the USA.44  
On the other hand, we may assume that the alliance from the Cold War era would endure 
the new threats and challenges and that the Western community of values has not ceased to exist 
but has begun transforming into a ‘more conflicting community,’ a community which is, 
nevertheless, driven by the will to actively deal with and overcome the conflicts. Extensive trade 
between the two Atlantic coasts, the largest flow of goods and investments in the world45 prove 
the tight bond. (The trade exchange exceeds USD 500 billion, creating some six million jobs on 
both sides of the Atlantic.)46 
According to Richard Holbrook, the United States was a ‘European power’ throughout 
the Cold War era.47 Back in 1990, the then US President George Bush claimed that: ‘We are not 
in Europe for the sake of the Europeans – we are in Europe for our own sake.’48 With the end of 
the Cold War, however, the unifying threat of Communism has disappeared and, for many 
authors, the world has shifted from the bipolar to a multipolar model, by the virtue of which the 
reason for US ‘hegemony’ over Europe has disappeared. One thing must be highlighted, 
however: the current condition of the transatlantic security relation is largely a legacy of the Cold 
War. Europe has not been able to cast away this legacy and the and so has Europe’s ‘security 
dependence’ on the USA persisted. Western Europe got used to not being engaged in its own 
security during the Cold War and the reactions to the end of the Cold War era were by no means 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
42 Otte, M.: ESDP and Multilateral Security Organizations. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 53.  
43 Solana, J: Foreword. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. VII.  
44 Transatlantic Trends 2004. German Marshall Fund, Washington 2004.  
45 Up to now, American investment in the Netherlands has been higher than the US investment in China. Similarly, 
the French investment in Texas is greater than the French investment in the whole of China (Němec, P.: Atlantická 
obchodní válka? Važme slova. Hospodářské noviny, 26/4/2005.  
46 Solana, 2002, p. VII.  
47 Föhrenbach, 2002, p. 12.  
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adequate. At the same time, and quite paradoxically, this European ‘dependency’ on the USA 
deepens the transatlantic divergences caused by the fact that Europe relies less on military power 
in dealing with conflicts and tends to criticise US solutions based on force. Some authors go as 
far as to speak of a new ‘European appeasement’.49 American political scientist Robert Kagan 
described this quite aptly in his famous essay Power and Weakness50 by claiming that ‘the USA 
come from Mars and Europe from Venus’ – whereas it was exactly the other way round before 
World War II. This process runs parallel with similar developments in the ‘European public 
opinion’51 which has – since the 1980s – been generally strongly anti-war and even anti-American 
or at least has not largely approved of the current US role in the world, trusting more to Europe 
which, however, is hardly breathing down America’s neck in terms of political clout and global 
role.52  
NATO, born as an alliance to defend the West against the Soviet block, is the major 
security glue in the transatlantic relations which has less and less practical use, however, after the 
Cold War and whose future is not quite clear.53 Both Europeans and Americans continued to 
speak about the necessary reform of the alliance after the Cold War in order to modify NATO to 
be able to operate outside Europe and the North Atlantic region. Some substantial reform steps 
were taken at the 1999 Washington summit where a new strategic concept was endorsed. On the 
2002 Prague summit NATO Rapid Reaction Forces were created, and, finally, at the 2004 
Istanbul summit out-of-area operations were officially promoted on the basis of the NATO-
headed operation in Afghanistan. As much as there is no doubt about the actual irreplaceability 
of NATO’s operational and planning capacities, the political meaning of this organisation has 
become a moot point. More and more voices can be heard about NATO being an obsolete 
political structure out of all current and future reality of the EU-US relations.54 Given their recent 
foreign and security policy unilateralism, Americans are not increasing NATO’s political prestige 
either: on the one hand, they declare NATO to be indispensable (and any autonomous European 
defence policy redundant). On the other hand, their recent political conduct has revealed that 
they do not need NATO at all.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Serfaty, S: Anti-Europeanism in America and Anti-Americanism in Europe. In: Balis, Serfaty (eds.), 2004, p. 6.  
50 Kagan, 2002.  
51 The term ‘European public opinion’ is a highly problematic one. Some authors, such as Domique Reynié, point 
out that it is especially in relation to the war in Iraq and the US role in the world that such a phenomenon does exist.  
52 Eurobarometr 62, Autumn 2004.  
53 Layne, 2001.  
54 Van Ham, 2001.  
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3.2. Post 9/11 transatlantic relations 
  
The terrorist attacks at New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 have surely 
brought a similarly important impetus for change in the transatlantic relations as the end of the 
Cold War. The 9/11 attacks also brought an unprecedented confirmation of the existence of 
new, asymmetric threats in the post-Cold War world.  
September 11 was a milestone for the involvement of Europeans in the defence of the 
West. European states expressed enormous solidarity with their attacked US ally, promising their 
extensive engagement in the war against terrorism. And they were serious.55 European NATO 
members decided to evoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time and many of 
them – Great Britain, France and Germany, in particular – were actively involved in the 
operations against the Taliban and Al-Quaeda in Afghanistan as well as in the post-war ISAF 
administration of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the generally cold reactions by the USA to this 
European solidarity and engagement and the clear choice of unilateralism by the Bush 
administration have been disappointing for a number of European politicians, especially those 
from France and Germany. In their eyes, this has confirmed the interpretation of the USA as no 
longer considering the partnership with Europe to be crucial.56 Nevertheless, the major crisis of 
the ‘transatlantic trust’ which has probably been more serious and grave than all the previous 
ones, including the Suez crisis or France’s abandoning of NATO military structures, came with 
the war in Iraq. The transatlantic rupture during the ‘Iraq crisis’ between January and March 2003 
was enormous indeed. It was also extremely confusing for many countries, such as the post-
communist states. The Iraq crisis split Europe into two camps, showing what a utopia the oft 
declared European unity in foreign and security policy is and how divergent the views and 
ambitions of European countries are in relation to Europe’s position vis-à-vis the USA the 
optimum response to the security threats of the world today. In a sense, the post-Cold War 
transatlantic rift was, sooner or later, inevitable.57 Diverse interests have appeared after the joint 
threat disappeared and different perceptions of the world on the two sides of the Atlantic have 
become apparent.  
   
                                                          
3.3. Changing US foreign and security policy 
  
The war in Iraq played such a crucial role in the transatlantic relations not least for the 
fact that it was largely a proof of major changes in the US foreign and security policy after 9/11. 
55 Parmantier, G.: Diverging Visions. In: Balis, Serfaty (eds.), 2004, p. 116.  
56 Ibid, p. 118.  
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The foreign and security policy pursued by the Bush administration is, in many a respect, a 
continuation of the policy implemented by the previous administration and could be understood 
within the context of new U.S foreign policy developments in the post-Cold War environment. 
Yet, it has been the administration of President George Bush jr. that has reinforced and 
accelerated this trend in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, putting foreign and security policy at the 
top of the US domestic policy agenda and making it – as the ‘War on Terror’ – a clear priority of 
President Bush’s first term in office. Some authors go as far as to speak of Bush’s ‘revolution in 
foreign policy.’58 What are the major features of this ‘revolution’ whose main pillars can be found 
in the above mentioned National Security Strategy of 2002 but whose practical manifestation has 
gone beyond this document, a ‘revolution’ often labelled as ‘neoconservative’ as the so called 
neoconservatives, holding key positions in the Bush administration, are the carriers of this 
change? First of all, it is an attempt to break out of the post-war order logic, namely challenge the 
role of international law and the UN while beginning to face global challenges effectively.59 
President Bush’s statement in a conference only a few days after the 9/11 attacks that ‘there are 
no rules’ in today’s world is a fitting summary of the change in the US post-September foreign 
and security policy that was to come.60 
In spite of talking about the foreign policy of a Republican administration – and 
throughout the US history, Republican administrations inclined to realism in foreign policy – a 
key, if not the dominant, feature of this administration’s foreign policy is idealism, even though 
the protection of America’s interests surely is not sidelined. Without any hyperbole we may talk 
about trying to ‘save the world’ under the aegis of the USA. This idealism, drawing heavily upon 
the work of Israeli author Nathan Sharansky,61 is based upon a belief that once dictatorships are 
removed from the world and replaced by democracies, permanent peace and prosperity will be 
guaranteed. These goals are to be striven for with great vehemence (zero sum game) and use various 
                                                          
tools which may not always be generally acceptable, such as pre-emptive war principle and regime 
change, by and large in the spirit of ‘the end justifies the means’. Even though the neocon – and 
largely black-and-white – visions are not something that would appeal to the pluralistic 
Europeans, it is chiefly the means used by the neoconservative foreign policy-makers that raise 
most doubt across the Atlantic.62 There is a general consensus in the Western community over 
the rightness of the principle of humanitarian intervention, such as the one in Kosovo, and looser 
interpretations would find some support for this principle in international law. What is not, 
58 Daalder, I., Linsay, J.: America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington 2003.  
59 Hurell, A.: There Are No Rules. In: International Relations, No.2, 2002. 
60 Ibid, p. 186.  
61 The Odd Couple. Economist, 3/2/2005.  
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however, a matter of consensus, is the unilateralist tendency of this foreign policy. According to 
French security expert François Heisbourg,63 it is this unilateralism that may bring the end of the 
West because it is a sign of contempt of – namely European – allies and of a ‘hegemonic 
temptation’ of the single global superpower of today.64 The unilateralism of the Bush 
administration and the war on terror marks, in actual fact, a return to the Cold War logic of the 
presence of a permanent enemy. Only Europe is not really counted on according to this logic.  
The lesser US interest in Europe is manifested not only through a gradual pull-out of the 
US troops from Europe but also through the unwillingness to perceive Europe as a whole while 
trying to pick the ‘right ones’ from the continent, those who are willing to join the USA (New 
Europe) and the ‘wrong ones’ who do not share the US visions (Old Europe). This 
differentiation presupposes the creation of the ‘coalitions of the willing’ made of those world 
countries that are willing to join in and contribute to the achievement of some US objective, 
following the ‘coalition does not define the mission but the mission defines the coalition’ logic.65 
This, however, is against the basic principles not only of the EU’s CFSP but also of NATO itself.  
It is quite obvious that the current American foreign policy is not just a matter of the 
Bush administration and that the development is, to a certain extent, irreversible and the next US 
administration will not be willing and able to abandon this course.66 On the other hand, there can 
be and probably already is a shift in the style of behaviour to and in communication with Europe. 
This was manifest throughout George W. Bush’s February visit to Europe during which the US 
President made a significant gesture of recognition of the European Union and the EU 
institutions: he did not visit the capitals of the large European states but came to the European 
Council summit in Brussels and visited the seat of the European Commission. Not even this 
‘reconciliation’ visit did, however, help to overcome mutual disputes which are aplenty these 
days, from the divergent views on the Iran nuclear programme and the cancellation of embargo 
on arms export to China, to the disputes over the International Crime Tribunal or the Kyoto 
protocol, to the disagreements in the World Trade Organisation. It appears, though, that the 
desire to overcome the discord is still prevailing on both sides of the Atlantic.67 The Iraq crisis 
seems to be forgotten now and common values and the ensuing long-term interests of the West 
are getting prevalence again even though the USA and Europe have still more disagreement over 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
62 Courmont, 2003.  
63 Heisbourg, F.: La fin de l’Occident. Odile Jacob, Paris 2005.  
64 The former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine even talks of a ’hyperpower’: Védrine, H.: Face à 
l’hyperpuissance. Fayard, Paris 2003.  
65 The terms ‘New Europe’ and ‘Old Europe’ as well as the ‘coalition of the willing’ principle have been introduced 
by the US State Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. 
66 Courmont, 2003. 
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how to enforce and protect these. The European Security Strategy is a good case in point, 
identifying more or less the same threats as the US National Security Strategy and giving the USA 
a privileged position of a partner in managing these threats, in spite of the ways of facing these 
threats being different on the two sides of the Atlantic.  
We may thus conclude this chapter with an optimistic claim that the transatlantic 
community is a ‘conflicting community’ after the end of the Cold War but it is a community after 
all.  
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4. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP): DEVELOPMENTS 
AND KEY FEATURES 
 
4.1. Pre-ESDP developments 
 
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as we know and analyse is today was 
preceded by a relatively long development starting back in the 1950s. European integration 
evolved over the Cold War era, one of the main objectives being to cordon off Communism 
from Western Europe. It was politically impossible to distinguish between NATO, the European 
Communities and parallel security structures in Western Europe which were linked to the North-
Atlantic Alliance during the Cold War era. These parallel structures included, in particular, the 
West European Union and a failed project of the European Defence Community – the ‘Pleven 
Plan’ – geared towards the remilitarization of West Germany within the framework of a 
supranational organisation and common military structures which might, with some license, be 
labelled as a ‘European army. The European Defence Community project was not implemented 
in the end because of the rejection of the plan by the French National Assembly in 1954, due to 
the major influence the French Communist Party at that time. The other European security 
structure, the West European Union (WEU), however, did overcome the twists and turns of 
history. Originally, a defence alliance was established back in 1948 by France, Great Britain and 
other countries to safeguard them against Germany (the Brussels Pact, the alliance’s founding 
treaty, expired in 2002). This Western Union Defence Organisation was transformed into a West 
European Alliance in 1955 as the Federal Republic of Germany was remilitarised and joined 
NATO (WEU was under the military control of NATO during the Cold War).68 The sixties and 
seventies saw attempts at the deepening of political integration of EC Member States which was, 
from the very beginning, understood as the reason behind establishing the EC, though through 
economics.69 The ‘Fouchet Plan’ (1961) was another attempt at this direction, inspired by the 
ideas of French President De Gaulle on the political and security emancipation of France and the 
whole Europe from the two superpowers of the Cold War, superpowers that were often – and 
even more so during the détente period – overlooking Western Europe in their negotiations.70 The 
Fouchet Plan resembles the current CFSP in many respects, namely in foreign and security policy 
cooperation between the Member States of the European Communities. But this plan had to be 
brushed off since it might threaten the spirit de corps of the Western bloc in the Cold War 
                                                          
68 Fidler, J., Mareš, P.: Dějiny NATO. Paseka, Praha 1997. 
69 This view is supported by the Treaty of Rome preamble identifying the aim of integration: an ever closer union.  
70 Cameron, 1999. 
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context. A plan presented by Commissioner Etienne Davignon (1970) was much less ambitious 
and lead, in the end, to the establishment of the European Political Cooperation – a fairly limited 
mechanism of EU Member State foreign policy coordination.71  
It was only at the end of the Cold War that this situation changed. The transformation of 
the security environment, described above, and the slowly weakening interest of the USA in 
Europe put a new burden on Europe’s shoulders: Europe was to become responsible for itself if 
nothing else. The early 1990s saw the revival of the WEU which was to turn into a purely 
European security structure operating parallel to NATO. On the basis of this initiative by France 
and Germany, joint international units such as Eurocorps, Eurofor, and Euromarfor, were 
established with three states dominating this effort: France, Germany and Spain. In 1992, the 
WEU member states defined new tasks of this organisation – the ‘Petersberg Tasks’, focused on 
humanitarian operations, conflict-resolution or peacemaking, and peacekeeping.  
The revitalisation of WEU was, nevertheless, overshadowed by another event: the 
establishment of the European Union by the Treaty of Maastricht, a major step forward in 
Europe’s political integration, and the creation of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security 
(CFSP). CFSP, however, turned out to be a ‘still-born baby’ soon after its birth because the EU 
states were unable to find a consensus vis-à-vis the boiling conflict in the former Yugoslavia over 
the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.72 The EU inability due to its political fragmentation and 
actual military capacities to prevent or manage the civil war in the Balkans made the USA 
intervene once again in the ‘European backyard.’ The Bosnian lesson was a ‘cold shower’ for, and 
a reason for great self-reflection in, the EU.73  
The 1997 Amsterdam summit saw the EU incorporating the WEU whose founding treaty 
was to expire in five years, adopting the above Petersberg tasks, and creating the post of an EU 
High Representative for CFSP (and the Secretary General of the Council of the EU at the same 
time), a post taken by former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana two years after that.  
In the meantime, a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) concept has been 
created on the basis of WEU, integrated into the EU in 1999 after the Amsterdam Treaty became 
effective. The ESDI project, endorsed already at the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels and fully 
supported by the Clinton administration encouraging Europe to take over the responsibility for 
itself, was to become a ‘European NATO pillar’ of a sort. The ESDI was a cherished project of 
France, which was seeking rapprochement with NATO and considered returning into NATO 
military structures at that time. The ESDI project counted on the formation of European 
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72 Gnesotto, N.: La puissance et l’Europe. Presses de Sciences Po, Paris 1998, pp. 9-14.  
21 
Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, Rytířská 31, Praha 1, 110 00 
Tel: 221610206, europeum@europeum.org, www.europeum.org  
73 Otte, 2002, p. 41.  
Lukáš Pachta – European Security and Defence Policy in the Light of Transatlantic Relations  
Institute for European Policy EUROPEUM, June 2005  
Combined Joint Task Force under the operational and planning command of NATO 
headquarters in Europe (SHAPE).74  
 
4.2. Birth and Development of ESDP 
 
Things have started developing in a different direction, though. A ‘pro-European turn’75 
of the British foreign policy in relation to Labour Party leader Tony Blair becoming the UK 
Prime Minister brought about yet another initiative which has, in the end, proven more viable: an 
autonomous European Security and Defence Policy, outlined at the October 1998 EU summit in 
Portsäch and defined at the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998.76 A 
common defence policy was born, along with NATO-independent joint forces deployable for the 
implementation of the Petersberg tasks under the UN mandate. This Franco-British initiative 
stemmed from the political positions of the two main actors, i.e. UK Prime Minister Blair and 
French President Chirac, which will be discussed later in this paper, and also from the fact that 
France and Great Britain have been the only EU countries with truly operable military capacities 
to execute modern missions.  
  The Kosovo War, i.e. the NATO intervention under the US command, was another rude 
awakening for EU Member States who appeared to be unable to tackle problems in their ‘near 
abroad’. The Kosovo lesson brought a more specific ESDP and the Saint-Malo agreement.77 The 
EU adopted a European Headline Goal at the 1999 Helsinki summit, following discussions at the 
1999 Cologne summit.78 According to this European Headline Goal, (almost all) EU countries 
were to earmark by 2003 between 50,000 and 60,000 troops deployable within sixty days in the 
radius of action of 6,000 kilometres for one year. This EU Rapid Reaction Force was to 
implement the Petersberg tasks.79 A year later, at the Nice summit ending the EU’s 
Intergovernmental Conference, ESDP was incorporated into the EU primary law and EU 
political and military institutions under the European Council were established.80 These were 
similar to COREPER, i.e. included permanent representatives of EU Member States. It is 
unclear, however, what their specific competencies are with respect to the EU Council and its 
                                                          
74 Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 26.  
75 Khol, R.: Velká Británie – v srdci Evropy a v čele evropské obrany? In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p.18. 
76 Franco-British Summit: Declaration on European Defence, 4/12/1998.  
77 Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003.  
78 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 10-11 December, 1999. 
79 Van Ham, 2000. 
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formations as there are some overlaps between them. The same actually applies to the High 
Representative for CFSP and SHAPE. The following institutions are referred to: 
 
- Political and Security Committee (consists of permanent representatives of EU Member 
States – often juniors compared to COREPER or NATO; deals predominantly with the 
political aspects of ESDP – monitoring crisis areas; provides for early warning and political 
leadership of ESDP operations; prepares documents for General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) meetings) 
- Military Committee (the EU’s highest military body composed of members of the General 
Staff of EU Member States – usually the same ones as in NATO; provides other EU bodies 
with military information needed for military operations) 
- EU Military Staff (under the Military Committee, deals with practical ESDP operational 
issues) 
- EU Satellite Centre and EU Situation Centre  
 
The High Representative for CFSP (and the General Secretary of the EU Council), currently in 
the person of Javier Solana, is the coordinator of many ESDP aspects. It is necessary to note that 
many of the ESDP and CFSP achievements so far are generally ascribed to Solana’s personal 
credit. (He has been the hottest candidate for the future EU Foreign Minister post - see below). 
  The European Constitutional Treaty means a great leap forward for ESDP, providing the 
constitutional treaty (or a future similar treaty) is finally ratified, of course, or the relevant 
provisions from the treaty are introduced into practice without the ratification of the 
constitutional treaty. According to the constitution, ESDP shall get the most visible 
reinforcement from all CFSP components (a special ESDP working group was v established in 
the Convention on the Future of Europe preparing the draft constitutional treaty; the working 
group was chaired by the then French Commissioner Michel Barnier). 
The Constitution introduces a new legal option of a ‘permanent structured (or enhanced) 
co-operation’ in defence which the existing treaties did not allow for.81
                                                          
 This idea was initially 
opposed by Great Britain who has threatened to veto the draft if structured co-operation was not 
to be open to all states interested in participating and meeting specific criteria, to prevent the 
establishment of an exclusive ‘hard core’ made of some countries82. The constitution has also 
81 Article I-41 (6) of the Draft Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe.  
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made a step forward in making a commitment to mutual defence in case of a military attack on a 
Member State (mutual defence clause) or to civil and military assistance in case of a terrorist 
attack or a natural disaster (solidarity clause).83 A reference is made to Article 51 of the UN 
Charter providing for regional defence alliances. This mutual defence commitment, however, is 
quite problematic for neutral EU Member States some of which have an opt-out from defence 
co-operation as well as for some other EU countries which are also NATO members and are 
concerned about the potential collision with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.84 On the other 
hand, the European Union has been an entity made of politically interlinked states, so mutual 
assistance in case of an attack is quite commonplace and would presumably be provided even 
without an explicit mutual defence clause, irrespective of the fact that such a clause was included 
in the Western Union Brussels Pact effective between 1948 and 2002, i.e. outside NATO. The 
draft European Constitutional Treaty also extends the ESDP goals beyond the earlier mentioned 
Petersberg tasks: according to the constitution and the international law, the EU can carry out 
disarmament and anti-terrorist operations in and provide military advice to third countries.  
ESDP can be more successful with a newly established post of an EU Foreign Minister, a 
post merging the powers of the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative 
for CFSP in order to make the CSFP more coherent.85 The newly proposed flexibility in 
operation financing can make ESDP operations more effective: operations shall be financed not 
only from the Member States contributions proportionate to their GDP, as the is case today, but 
also from a Start Up Fund administered by the EU Foreign Minister and financed from Member 
States’ advance payments to be used in the time of operation.  
The constitution, however, does not envisage decisions being made on ESDP on behalf 
of the entire EU or the states participating in a structured co-operation by a qualified majority 
because the two major ESDP actors, Great Britain and France, insist on the intergovernmental 
principle and unanimity in decision-making.  
 
Finally, ESDP has been provided an official and theoretical base not only in the 
Constitution but also in the 2003 European Security Strategy the implementation and practical 
impact on ESDP of which, however, is up for debate.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
possibility of a state not being able to comply with them and being automatically excluded from structured co-
operation is very small.  
83 Articles I-41 (7) and I-43 of the Draft Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe.  
84 The constitution includes, at the same time, a guarantee for respecting national defence policies and NATO 
commitments (Král, D., Pítrová, L., Šlosarčík, I.: Smlouva zakládající ústavu pro Evropu – komentář. Institut pro 
evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, Praha 2004, p. 68).  
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4.3. There is no ESDP without NATO… 
 
The formal (or theoretical) and institutional shape of ESDP is quite advanced. But let us 
look at the implementation of the ESDP project in practice. The practical realisation of ESDP 
was a long-time hostage to the ambiguous relationship between ESDP and NATO.86 Given the 
fact that the EU has not had its own planning capacities, EU operations were to rely on NATO 
capacities. This principle was first proposed at the 1996 NATO summit in Berlin. That is why 
this 1996 agreement between NATO and the WEU was later called a ‘Berlin+ arrangement’. In 
order for EU states to use the SHAPE military and planning capacities87 for their own operations 
outside NATO, an agreement had to be made.88 This agreement was being blocked for a long 
time by Turkey, a NATO member without the membership of the EU who did not want to open 
up the way for EU countries to NATO capacities. (Another reason for Turkey to block this deal 
was the Turkish-Greek controversy over Cyprus and the planned accession of the Greek part of 
Cyprus to the EU). Nevertheless, the agreement was reached in December 2002 with the view of 
planned operations under the EU flag. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina starting in January 2003 was the first EU operation abroad, even though it was not a 
true ESDP (military) operation.89 It was only in March 2003, in operation Concordia in 
Macedonia (FYROM) that the Berlin+ arrangement was made the full use of. The EU forces 
took over the activities of three previous NATO operations: Allied Harmony, Essential Harvest, 
and Amber Fox. On December 2, 2004, EU units took over the NATO Althea operation in 
Bosnia (SFOR) and deployed 7,000 troops there (EUFOR).90 The use of the Berlin+ 
arrangement meant that only flags got actually changed in both of these operations: the planning, 
command and manning remained the same. The operations have remained under the command 
of the NATO Deputy-SACEUR, British general John Reith.91  
As soon as neither NATO units (KFOR) nor the UN and OSCE administration are 
needed in Kosovo and the status of the province is sorted out, the whole Former Yugoslavia will 
be under the aegis of the EU which will thus repay its old debt of failing to intervene during the 
war in Yugoslavia. The EU role in the Balkans is further reinforced by the prospect of EU 
                                                          
86 Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 356.  
87 For example, the AWACS surveillance planes play a major role in ESDP operations.  
88 Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 362.  
89 With a view to further EU police missions, several states (France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands) agreed last 
year, during the Dutch presidency, that new European paramilitary police units modelled on the French 
Gendarmerie or Italian Carabinieri be established.  
90 Řiháčková, V.: EU dnes přebírá od NATO misi v Bosně a Hercegovině. Integrace – kalendárium, 2/12/2004.  
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membership for all former Yugoslavian republics. Slovenia has already joined the EU and Croatia 
should be soon invited to start accession negotiations.92  
  Africa is the second area of ESDP focus. And it is Africa that is very likely to become the 
region of most ESDP activities: the USA and NATO are not really interested in intervening in 
Africa and the EU countries still have close ties with African countries since the colonial times.93 
In June 2003, two EU states, France and Great Britain, sent their troops (1,500 soldiers) under 
the UN Security Council mandate to the Democratic Republic of Congo in operation Artemis. 
This operation was not carried out according to the Berlin+ arrangement but according to the 
lead nation principle. This principle determines that an operation under the EU flag agreed by the 
entire Union is carried out by one or more states using their national capacities and units. Sadly 
though, it is only Great Britain and France that are actually capable of such missions in the EU.94  
 
4.4. From Rapid Reaction Force to Battle Groups 
 
In spite of the first real operations under the EU flag but with the units previously 
earmarked for NATO, the achievement of the 1999 European Headline Goal (EHG) formulated 
in Helsinki was still far from reality. In 2003, the European Council declared the EHG achieved 
since 50,000-60,000 troops were really earmarked for the Rapid Reaction Force. (The force, 
however, was not operable, largely due to the lack of means for unit transport which should be 
dealt with by introducing the new Airbus A400M carrier between 2008 and 2010 as planned).95 
The striving for compatibility between the EU Rapid Reaction Force and the NATO Response 
Force (endorsed at the Prague NATO summit in November 2002) made the whole matter even 
more challenging.  
The Helsinki European Headline Goal (EHG), achieved on paper but not satisfactorily 
met in practice, was replaced by a Headline Goal 2010, approved by the European Council in 
June 2004.96 The practical problems of forming the Rapid Reaction Force are to be solved 
through a speedy formation of Battle Groups or ‘tactical groups’, finally approved by EU 
Defence Ministers in November 200497. (This idea was supported by the way the Franco-British 
operation Artemis in Congo was carried out in June 2003). The total of 13 battle groups shall 
                                                          
92 Otte, 2002, p. 41.  
93 Pachta, L.: Role EU při prevenci a řešení konfliktů v Africe. In: Mezinárodní politika, No. 11, 2002.  
94 Khol (ed.), 2002.  
95 A European Capabilities Action Plan was adopted at the 2001 Laeken summit to ensure faster equipment of the 
Rapid Reaction Force. (Dumoulin, Mahieu, Sarlet, 2003, pp. 175-176). 
96 Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 17 – 18 June, 2004.  
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consist of 1,500 combat soldiers and three companies from three EU states. The Battle Groups 
shall be deployable within 15 days in the area of conflict up to 4,000 kilometres from Brussels 
and shall be sustainable for 30 days (extendable to 120 with rotation). The Battle Groups shall 
become fully operable in 2007, with the exception of one to be operable in 2005 already.98  
A special, autonomous EU planning cell shall be created at SHAPE.99 This reflects the 
ambitions of some EU Member States, lead by France, to cut European defence completely off 
NATO and establish a ‘European Defence Union’ in an avant-garde group of states. This EU 
planning cell was proposed at a ‘chocolate creams summit’ in Brussels in April 2003 which 
brought together the opponents of the Iraq war and advocates of strong European defence 
(France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg – the so called Gang of Four).100 The establishment 
of the planning unit was approved, in spite of the opposition by the USA – and objections by 
Great Britain – at the ‘Naples Conclave,’ a meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Naples in 
November 2003. It was more or less a symbolic act though. The cell, located at Tervuren, on the 
outskirts of Brussels, is at its infancy with its current 40 staff and it does not look like developing 
extensively any time soon without a close link to SHAPE, as Great Britain expects, to say nothing 
of planning autonomous operations (jointly with the EU Military Staff) without any NATO help. 
 
4.5. Main stumbling block: defence spending 
 
The above documents a relatively fast and dynamic development of ESDP101 – hardly five 
years did pass between the first ESDP ideas and the first operations. In many respects, however, 
ESDP is a typical European initiative: the centre of gravity is on paper and not on the ground – 
just like the establishment of the post of an EU Foreign Minister is a response to the issue of 
CFSP coherence à la EU which does not really solve the problem. The success of ESDP is 
restricted by the divergent goals and ambitions of individual EU Member States, namely the big 
ones (see below) and, more importantly, the actual military capacities of Europeans.102 The EU 
can, according to the 2002 agreement, rely on NATO planning capacities but the armament and 
equipment of EU states is lagging behind on all accounts, mainly in comparison with the USA.  
The low spending on defence is Europe’s major problem in this respect. It is not the 
ESDP contributions by Member States (operations are paid by EU members in proportion to 
                                                          
98 Schmitt, B.: European Capabilities – How Many Divisions? In: Gnesotto (ed.), 2004, p. 98.  
99 Ibid, pp. 99-100. 
100 Let us mention other initiatives presented at this ‘chocolate creams summit’: a Franco-German brigade modelled 
on the Eurocorps (up to 7,000 men) and the establishment of a European Security and Defence College. (Dumoulin, 
A.: Europe Occidentale. In: Boniface,P. (ed.): L’Année stratégique 2004, IRIS, Paris 2003, p. 86).  
101 Gnesotto, 2004, p. 11. 
102 Ibid, p. 11.  
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their GDP with the possibility of absence from an operation) but the generally low national 
defence budgets of the EU countries that make it difficult. According to the Financial Times,103 
the European members of NATO spent USD 221 billion in 2003 (1.9% of their GDP), 
compared with the US spending of USD 405 billion (3.7% of their GDP). The EU countries 
spending most on defence, i.e. France and Britain, increase their defence budgets each year by 3-
4% on average whereas the USA do so by 15%. There is a clear gap between the ambitions 
(autonomous European defence and military readiness of Europe) and the willingness to pursue 
these goals through higher defence spending which would necessarily have to shake up the 
European welfare state model.  
 
4.6. European defence industry 
 
Europe can boast of more achievements in defence industry. In spite of the largely 
economic reasons for this development104 politics plays also an important role: European 
corporations are not, with some exceptions, in the hands of the state but it is crucial for the 
general political and military prestige of Europe that these corporations succeed in developing 
new, technologically advanced weapons systems.  
European corporations such as EADS,105 Thales or BAE Systems have already started 
giving jitters to their US competitors who got used to their monopoly in defence industry.106 
European corporations have started to implement grandiose projects such as the A400M carrier, 
the Eurofighter jet or the combat helicopter Tiger. Technologically, these projects are as good as 
the American ones though the acquisition costs are still higher. European companies have already 
started winning contracts from the Pentagon which is also an incentive since the EU states’ 
defence budgets are still relatively low. The question is what effect the advised but still 
unconfirmed abandoning of the embargo for EU arms exports to China will have on European 
defence industry. On the one hand, Chinese demand may stimulate European supply. On the 
other hand, European corporations might be seriously harmed if Washington reacted by 
imposing sanctions on Europe, keeping Europeans off the US market.  
Europe is also relatively successful in developing modern technologies with no immediate 
but potential future military use and definite importance for Europe’s prestige in the world. The 
                                                          
103 Dombey, D.: Europe must spend more on defence. Financial Times, 3/3/2005.  
104 Maulny, J.-P.: L’industrie d’armement, acteur et bénéficiaire de l’Europe de la défense ? In: La revue internationale 
et stratégique, No. 48, 2002/2003.  
105European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, a new corporation established after a merger of the French 
Aerospatiale Matra, German Daimler-Chrysler and Spanish Construcciones Aeronáuticas in 2000. 
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finalisation of the preparatory works for the Galileo satellite navigation system competing with 
the US GPS or the European Space Agency (ESA) exploratory initiatives can be mentioned in 
this respect.  
  Europe has also made some progress in the coordination in armaments and military 
research, knowing that one state is too little in this respect.107 Following many previous 
initiatives108 aimed at enhancing cooperation in this area, a European armaments, research and 
military capacities agency (European Defence Agency) was established. The agency is provided 
for in the European constitutional treaty but, following a Council Decision, it has already been in 
full operation since July 2004, headed by Brit Nick Witney. The agency’s mission is to promote 
the enhancement of EU Member States’ military capacities (a commitment made, among others, 
in the constitutional treaty), coordinate military research, and monitor the fulfilment of Member 
States’ obligations. The overall aim is to rationalise through co-operation the increase of military 
capacities of EU states and prevent duplicities. 
                                                          
107 Keohane, D.: Europe’s new defence agency. Centre for European Reform - Policy Brief, June 2004.  
29 
Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, Rytířská 31, Praha 1, 110 00 
Tel: 221610206, europeum@europeum.org, www.europeum.org  
108 Western European Armaments Group – 1992, Letter of Intent – 1998, Organisme Conjoint de Coopération en 
Matière d’Armement (OCCAR) – 1998 or approved liberalisation of trade in military material in the single market. 
Lukáš Pachta – European Security and Defence Policy in the Light of Transatlantic Relations  
Institute for European Policy EUROPEUM, June 2005  
5. KEY ACTORS’ PERCEPTION OF ESDP  
 
The various and often contradictory visions of actors, i.e. countries involved, have to be 
taken into account when studying the ESDP project. It is only the differentiation between these 
views on ESDP that allows us to get a better understanding of both the real and potential impact 
of ESDP on the transatlantic relationship. Some more pro-European and ‘EU-ambitious’ states 
perceive ESDP as a baseline for the construction of a European identity109 and a way to secure a 
global role for the EU. Other states, seen as ‘Atlanticist’, understand ESDP (with the rather 
minimalist objectives) as a value added to NATO, and not as a replacement of the Alliance as 
known today. 
The following chapter will deal mainly with the positions and views of the big EU states 
and major ESDP actors: Great Britain, France and Germany. European integration did replace 
the ‘European concert’, giving small states a voice much stronger than their size and real weight 
would suggest, which is a good example of the ‘overrepresentation’ of small states in EU 
institutions. And yet, we can say that the real EU foreign and security legitimacy and potential 
comes from large states with their own, well-respected global engagements and operable armies. 
There would be no ESDP if the big EU states did not find agreement among themselves.110 We 
shall also turn to the position of the United States, a key country in terms of ESDP and the 
transatlantic relationship, and also to Russia and small EU states, particularly the post-communist 
ones.  
 
 5.1. Great Britain – from ‘Splendid Isolation’ to ‘Lead Nation’ role  
 
Great Britain plays a key role in the ESDP project. Britain’s political weight in the world, 
its position vis-à-vis the USA, and its military capacities are indispensable for ESDP. Great 
Britain is also a country that has been able to adapt its military force to new challenges and has 
been approaching the USA with its technologies and operability of its force deployable anywhere 
in the world most of all the other NATO states.111 At the same time, Great Britain was a country 
blocking any further, namely political integration of the EU for a considerable time, opposing 
European defence parallel with NATO. For a long time, Great Britain gave preference to its 
                                                          
109 Chilton, P.: La défense européenne, condition nécessaire à la formation d’une identité européenne ? In: La revue 
internationale et stratégique, č. 48, 2002/2003.  
110 This is illustrated aptly by the EU initiative in relation to the Iran nuclear programme from November 2003, 
promote by Foreign Ministers of the three largest EU countries.  
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‘special relationship’ with the USA before Europe in the area of foreign and security activities. 
(Nicole Gnesotto wrote that ‘For Britain, the United States is what Europe is for France.’).112  
A major change came with UK’s new Prime Minister Tony Blair who won the election in 
1997. The Blair government made a U-turn in Britain’s EU policy113 and was quite open about its 
attempts to ‘put Britain in the heart of Europe’.114 Lead by Tony Blair, Great Britain has been 
actively involved in the European integration process, chiefly on the intergovernmental level 
though. Along with France, Britain has become the main initiator and the driving force of ESDP. 
Some authors claim that Blair is using ESDP as a trump card even towards the USA, to show 
that Britain is not that dependent on the USA. (Similarly, the Brits are playing the US card against 
Europe). ESDP is also a tool used in trying to influence Washington.115 Blair’s Britain is taking a 
position of an intermediary in the transatlantic relation, using it exquisitely for its own purposes 
as well, though one might doubt Britain’s real influence on decision-making in Washington.  
Great Britain has adopted a very pragmatic approach towards ESDP. The country is 
aware of the need for Europeans to assume responsibility for their own security and the security 
of their neighbourhood. But it has refused to make ESDP highly ambitious. It has strictly 
adhered to a minimalist vision of ESDP, one designed to accomplish only the Petersberg tasks 
without disturbing and duplicating the role of NATO where the Brits play the most important 
role after the USA and which is still considered irreplaceable by the UK. Britain is convinced that 
the ESDP should not aim at a total independence from NATO but that the ‘EU should be a 
smart client of NATO’s military services.’116 The Brits are also insisting on ESDP being open to 
all EU states. Britain opposes the EU defence hard core or avant-garde vision, reiterating the 
need for openness of structured co-operation in defence for other states that would like to join.117 
The UK Labour politicians believe that ESDP will ultimately be better with the Brits in rather 
than out and that Britain must not absentee from this project because it might then ‘degenerate’ 
into something harmful for the transatlantic security relation.118 And the British role in ESDP 
should not be minimal but that of a leader, given Britain’s weight and military capacities.119 What 
might threaten this prospect is perhaps only a change on the domestic political scene because the 
conservative opposition is not in favour of ESDP at all and often refers to ESDP – incorrectly 
and in a populist fashion – as to a ‘European army’. 
                                                          
112 Gnesotto, 1998, p. 96.  
113 Some continuity with the unrealized plans of Prime Minister John Major might be observed here though.  
114 Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 36.  
115 Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 38; Schweiss, 2003, p. 230. 
116 Khol, R.: Velká Británie…In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 21. 
117 Ibid, p. 20. 
118 Grant, C.: EU Defence Takes a Step Forward. Centre for European Reform – Policy Brief, December 2003. 
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5.2. France – driving force hard to control  
 
France is the main designer and mover of ESDP.120
                                                          
 The country has a very specific 
motivation for this though. The French Fifth Republic has always understood European 
integration - perceived in France as a ‘French child’121 - as an opportunity to advance their own 
interests (‘an extended arm of France’). And since France is rather in favour of intergovernmental 
integration,122 CFSP, along with its most recent top-up, ESDP, is completely in line with the 
French interests. That is why the political scene (democratic parties) is so united on ESDP issues.  
For France, ESDP is much more than just meeting the Petersberg tasks. The French 
vision of ESDP envisages autonomous European defence123 and security emancipation vis-à-vis 
the USA and NATO the military structures of which France left in 1960s. In France’s view, 
NATO is an antiquated instrument of US security dominance.124 Instead of relying on NATO, 
Europe should seek complete defence autonomy to meet the criteria of a global power, in line 
with the ‘Europe puissance’ concept.125 France’s core assumption is that Europe has its legitimate 
interests, resting on universally valid values, which might differ from the US interests,126 and 
Europe should be able to support these interests with adequate political power and military force. 
The basic premise of France is that the EU is a more universal security structure than NATO: it 
has a wide range of instruments available, from humanitarian aid and assistance to cooperation 
and diplomacy to military force, all perfectly in line with the modern understanding of 
comprehensive security. That is why, France believes, the EU has a chance of a greater success 
than the USA in, e.g. fighting terrorism where pure military power does not help much.127  
France is therefore pushing for a fully autonomous ESDP, independent of NATO, i.e. 
with its own planning capacities, an ESDP relying on international organisations, especially the 
UN. At the same time, France is a great believer in enhanced co-operation among those EU 
states that wish to go further in European defence than others. This hard core or avant-garde 
concept is an expression of their ‘European security and defence union’.128 The above mentioned 
‘chocolate creams summit’ of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003 in 
120 Andréani, G.: L’Europe de la défense : y a t-il encore une ambition française ? In: Politique. étrangère, No. 4, 
2002. 
121 Defarges, P.M.: La Fance et l’Europe: l’inévitable débat. In: Politique étrangère, No. 4, 2002.  
122 Eichler, J.: Francie – důraz na mezivládní rámce CFSP a ESDP. In: Khol (ed.), 2002.  
123 European defence (défense européenne) is frequently used in French discourse when referring to ESDP. 
124 Parmentier, 2004, p. 125. 
125 Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 64. 
126 Parmenier, 2004, p. 127. 
127 Eichler, 2002, pp. 37-38. 
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Brussels was a prime example of this approach. France stipulates that ESDP must remain a 
project for EU members only. ESDP is a clear manifestation of EU political integration, in the 
eyes of France, which satisfies the Greeks but displeases the non-EU members of NATO, 
especially Turkey. But France, with its military potential comparable to that of Great Britain, is 
not really willing to bring its defence spending up which underscores its ambitious ESDP visions.  
In many respects, the French ambitions are founded. What is problematic though is the 
quite blunt assertion of these ambitions which does not win them much trust with most of EU 
countries, to say nothing of the USA. The French ESDP ambitions are understood as France’s 
attempt to reclaim its former position of a great power and advance its interests in Europe and in 
the world.  
 
5.3. Germany – civilian power with military ambitions  
 
All of the post-war policy of the Federal Republic of Germany has had a definite 
European dimension. European integration has been a chance for Germany to get out of the 
grips of World War II and, given the lack of a global outreach of West Germany’s foreign policy, 
Europe has been on top of the German foreign policy agenda. Along with France, Germany was 
the main driving force of European integration, including political integration. In its foreign and 
security policy, Germany has always preferred civilian instruments, multilateralism 
and coordination of its efforts with other states, except for a unilateralist push for the recognition 
of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991.129  
The German government under Gerhard Schröder has therefore been in favour of 
ESDP.130
                                                          
 In spite of Germany being a great champion and active member of NATO which has 
allowed for the remilitarisation and, in a sense, also the rehabilitation of Germany and despite 
Germany preferring strategic partnership with the USA for a long time, the ESDP, built on a 
broader and multilateral security concept, has some appeal to Germany. (Germany would even 
welcome if the ESDP issues were decided by qualified majority which is opposed by Great 
Britain and France.) The German government perceives ESDP as a chance to increase the 
political and military weight of Germany in foreign policy which has not been possible so far 
because of Germany’s internal restraints. Germany’s government is also seeking a permanent 
chair in the Security Council.131 The German efforts at the country’s military emancipation 
translated into Germany’s intensive involvement in KFOR in Kosovo (the first deployment of 
129 Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, p. 45.  
130 Ibid, p. 50.  
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German forces abroad after WWII) or in the ISAF force in Afghanistan where Germany has got 
the lead nation position. Within the context of European integration, Germany is slowly shifting 
from the traditional role of communitarism and small states champion to the role of a European 
power on the par with France and Great Britain. ESDP, on the other hand, exerts a great 
pressure on the reform of the German Bundeswehr and the enhancement of German armed 
forces in general, as well as on the defence budget, of course. Germany, despite its ambition to be 
the key component of ESDP, might end up being dominated by France and Great Britain 
because of its actual military capacities and relatively low defence spending - Germany spends 
only 1.14% of its GDP on defence, compared with France’s 2.18% and Britain’s 2.58%.132  
The ‘anti-American sting’ of the 2002 election campaign added yet another dimension to 
German foreign and security policy.133 In line with the pacifist and anti-American public opinion 
in Germany, the government puts less emphasis now on NATO and the alliance with the USA 
while promoting more the need for European defence emancipation. The current German 
government is very close to the French one in this respect. Chancellor Schröder had a very 
surprising speech at a Munich security conference in February 2005 where he spoke of his belief 
that NATO was not the organisation for the transatlantic security partnership of the future.134 
Instead, the Chancellor proposed a direct dialogue between the EU and the USA. The opposition 
CDU/CSU does not appear to share this vision though. Yet, it is probable that, given the current 
public opinion in Germany, the next German government where CDU/CSU will be represented 
will not change this direction taken by Schröder and Fischer, a direction of exclusive promotion 
of ESDP at the expense of NATO and of the emancipation of Europe from the USA.  
  
5.4. United States of America – ambiguous enthusiasm  
 
The United States has been a supporter of European integration from the very 
beginning.135 Political and economic co-operation of West European countries, bringing peaceful 
relations and economic prosperity while halting the spread of communism, was beneficial for US 
interests during the Cold War. At the same time, the USA had a huge political influence over 
Western Europe, trying to control the process of European integration, which was relatively easy 
during the Cold War, given the circumstances. European political integration, accelerated towards 
                                                          
132 Boniface, P.(ed.): L’Année strategique 2005. IRIS, Paris 2004. 
133 Handl, V.: Německo – politický závazek s dlouhodobým plněním. In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 50.  
134 The German Chancellor nevertheless mentioned something that has had some resonance in academia for quite 
some time and has generally been accepted. The full text of the speech can be found on www.securityconference.de. 
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the end of the Cold War, however has not won a full US support, as documented by the 
permanent US promotion of Turkey’s membership in the EU.  
As the US interest in Europe started fading towards the end of the Cold War, the United 
States welcomed European initiatives aimed at assuming more responsibility for European 
security and at lessening the need for any future US intervention on the continent as in the case 
of wars in former Yugoslavia. The USA has thus become an active supporter of the European 
Security and Defence Identity in NATO which was to become a ‘European NATO pillar’, 
allowing for greater burden sharing among allies.136  
The US position on ESDP itself, however could best be termed as ‘ambiguous 
enthusiasm’.137 On the one hand, the US has still been quite happy with Europeans trying to gain 
more military autonomy and end their security dependence on the USA, which (namely in terms 
of the US units in Europe) is quite costly for the United States and still harder to defend 
domestically. On the other hand, Clinton’s administration - and there is some continuity here 
even in the Bush administration though the latter is less interested in Europe, just like the mostly 
Republican Congress – was clearly worried that ESDP might, over time, torpedo NATO. The 
surprising pro-European turn in Britain’s policy certainly played a role here.138 This worry was 
reflected in the formulation of three conditions under which the USA has been willing to accept 
ESDP. These three conditions specified by the Clinton administration in December 1998 and 
known as ‘three D’ included no decoupling, no discrimination and no duplication.
                                                          
139 This means that the 
USA has been against ESDP disturbing the transatlantic relation (no decoupling), against ESDP 
being an exclusively EU project closed to European NATO members, Turkey in particular (no 
discrimination), and against unnecessary duplication of the existing or developed NATO military 
and planning capacities (no duplication). These conditions have more or less been supported by 
some EU Member States, including Great Britain.140 The ‘no duplication’ requirement is, at the 
same time, a safeguard for a US ‘supervision’ of ESDP: Europeans should not seek to be 
completely independent of the USA and NATO in terms of planning and intelligence.141 We 
must point out that Europeans are not even capable of this at the moment – that is why the 
agreement on the EU’s access to NATO capacities was necessary for the past and present ESDP 
operations in Europe.  
136 Tertrais, B.: ESDP and Global Security Challenges. In: Brimmer (ed.), 2002, p. 117.  
137 Van Ham, 2000, p. 221.  
138 Layne, 2001. 
139 Khol, R.: Spojené státy americké… In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 67.  
140 Hamilton, 2002, p. 147.  
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 We may say that ESDP as such, i.e. an initiative within the framework of NATO and with 
fairly limited goals (the Petersberg tasks and interventions where neither the USA nor NATO 
chose to intervene), is acceptable for the USA. This, however, cannot be said about some, mostly 
French but increasingly also German, ESDP-linked ambitions. These ambitions, seeking to make 
the EU a global power equal to the United States and defending Europe’s interests even in 
defiance of the USA, or to transform the EU into an arena of competition with the US defence 
industry, surely are not in line with American interests.142 Americans often speak of their worries 
about the future of NATO in this respect but that is not quite frank.143 The approach of the 
current US administration, taking NATO as an ‘obedient reservoir’ of potential US allies for this 
or that operation, devalues NATO as an organisation and alliance in the eyes of Europeans, at 
the least.144 Americans are not so much worried about the fate of NATO with respect to ESDP 
and the European autonomisation aspirations, but rather about their dominance over Europe.  
The US approach to ESDP is, to a certain extent, based on the following logic: Europe 
and the USA are to work together through NATO and Europeans are capable of less in this co-
operation. Given their great burdens and low defence budgets, can they possibly handle the 
ESDP project as well?145 This more-than-justified US doubt is, at the same time, a self-
comforting assurance that the US political and military superiority cannot be questioned by 
Europe because the EU is simply unable to implement its visions and cannot even agree on these 
visions as it is not united. It is only logical that the US government of the day seeks to continue 
providing Europeans access to NATO military and planning capacities to keep them dependent 
on the USA in this respect while trampling down, in a way, the germs of European unity in 
foreign and security policy, just as Donald Rumsfeld did by talking of an Old and New Europe.  
 
5.5. Remaining ‘old’ Member States – mismatch of ambitions and capabilities  
 
The ESDP project is meeting with more or less agreement from other EU Member 
States. Most of them, however, are not able to contribute because of their insufficient military 
capacities, in spite of their quite big ambitions (e.g. Italy).146 Denmark is not taking part in ESDP 
and has had an opt-out since Maastricht and ‘neutral states’ (if one can speak of neutrality these 
days) have had quite understandable objections, especially if ESDP developed into a classic 
mutual defence; these countries must be excluded from the camp of clear supporters of ESDP. 
                                                          
142 Khol, R.: Spojené státy… In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 69.  
143 Hamilton, 2002, p. 147.  
144 Schneider, Žantovský, 2003, p. 2. 
145 Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001, p. 7.  
36 
Institut pro evropskou politiku EUROPEUM, Rytířská 31, Praha 1, 110 00 
Tel: 221610206, europeum@europeum.org, www.europeum.org  
146 Khol, R.: Itálie – politické ambice větší nežli možnosti. In: Khol (ed.), 2002.  
Lukáš Pachta – European Security and Defence Policy in the Light of Transatlantic Relations  
Institute for European Policy EUROPEUM, June 2005  
Most states, however, do welcome ESDP as a platform for carrying out the Petersberg tasks 
under the UN mandate (e.g. Sweden), or they accept this in the least (e.g. Ireland).147  
 
5.6. ‘New Europe’ – from Atlanticism to Europeanisation?  
 
New Member States recruited from post-communist countries have quite specific 
approaches to ESDP. Being more or less ‘Atlanticist’, they take the transatlantic relationship and 
NATO in particular as the cornerstone of their security.148 They also have warmer feelings 
towards the United States than the old Member States because they are thankful to the USA for 
dismantling communism in Europe. But that does not mean that these states, labelled as ‘New 
Europe’ by the US Defence Secretary, would not support the ESDP project – as long as priority 
is given to NATO operations. Until recently, states of New Europe made and wanted to make no 
political distinction between EU, NATO or ESDP as they saw no discrepancy there because they 
were willing to joint the Western ‘Euro-Atlantic’ structures.149 The Iraq crisis may be said to have 
questioned their a priori non-conflicting approach: they were made to ‘chose’ and almost all of 
them chose the side of the USA and their allies. The slight departure from Atlanticism and the 
incremental ‘Europeanisation’ of the foreign and security policy of post-communist countries 
which have joined or will join the EU are, nevertheless, inevitable in the future, says Janusz 
Bugajsky of the US Center for Strategic and International studies (CSIS).150  
 
5.7. Russia – opportunistic and unpredictable partner  
 
It is worth to mention the position of the Russian Federation on ESDP as well. The 
Russian approach to European integration is quite inconsistent. Russia is aware of the benefits 
the co-operation with Europe brings but has always perceived EU enlargement as a threat. At the 
same time, Russia is a master at exploiting the fact that EU Member States have very different 
views on the country and that there is no common EU policy on Russia. That is why Russia has 
started driving a wedge between EU Member States and has differentiated between these states, 
namely between the new and the old members.151 The Russian government has had a quite 
positive view of ESDP. It has perceived ESDP as a European security structure which has taken 
up, in Russia’s eyes, many of the activities of OSCE, initiated de facto by Moscow. Russia has 
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148 Schneider, 2005.  
149 Král, D., Pachta, L.: Česká republika a irácká krize. EUROPEUM, Praha 2005, p. 5.  
150 Bugajski, Teleki, 2005.  
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seen ESDP as an initiative which may do practically no harm to Russian interests and might, in a 
certain context, weaken NATO which has quite suited Russia for a long time.152 The 
multilateralist approach and the emphasis on the UN in ESDP are also very much in line with 
Russia’s interests. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has several times expressed its wish to get 
directly involved in ESDP but that has more or less been rejected by most EU states, especially 
the new members. To a certain extent, the Russian interest in ESDP is conditional on Russian-
US relations that had until recently been more than good (and have remained so, to some extent, 
thanks to the war on terror, although the US criticism of Russian domestic issues has been 
growing). In any case, Russia has clearly preferred its involvement in NATO which has included 
Russia’s voice through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council before ESDP.153  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
151 Král, D.: Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: Role of the New Members States and Candidate Countries. 
EUROPEUM, Praha 2005.  
152 Soukup, O., Votápek, V.: Rusko – pozitivnější přístup, nebo zmatení pojmů? In: Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 86.  
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6. SYNTHESIS: EFFECTS OF ESDP ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATION  
 
After we have dealt with transatlantic relations in the security domain, with the 
development and main features of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the 
positions of key ESDP actors let us now turn to the assessment of the actual and possible impact 
of ESDP on transatlantic relations.  
 
6.1. ESDP acceptable for all 
 
We may start by claiming that the existence of ESDP has long been seen as inevitable, a 
fait accompli which means that the current ESDP, based on co-operation and complementarity 
with NATO does not principally harm the transatlantic relation.154 The ESDP project has 
developed very fast and proved relatively high viability: it is now accepted by almost all EU states, 
including the three largest ones, as well as by the USA. First ESDP operations have successfully 
been carried out and ESDP as such has without major harms survived even the Iraq crisis.  
The general acceptability of the current ESDP is based on several preconditions. Through 
ESDP, Europe has been repaying its debts by taking up more responsibility for itself and its 
immediate neighbourhood at a time when it has been enjoying relative peace and security, unlike 
the United States.155 Nevertheless, the EU’s possibilities to replace NATO completely in the 
issues of European defence and security and take over the US role of the loudest voice and actor 
of Western community are still quite limited. This helps, on the other hand, to inhibit any 
possible negative approaches to ESDP.  
Also, ESDP is acceptable because it is an absolutely logical step in political integration: 
ESDP is closely linked with and includes the values of EU states and therefore plays a certain 
role in building the European identity without a state-like community being created from the 
EU.156 In other words, the achievement of ESDP objectives is a chance for EU states to 
implement their foreign and defence policy in line with their values and principles, helping the 
rest of the world as well. Many politicians understand such global involvement of the EU not as a 
possibility or option but as a duty. They believe that the Union has more than enough legitimacy 
to do so as a unified position of all 25 or more Member States is needed (which has some weight 
in itself) and enough means. In terms of hard power, the European Union cannot equal the 
United States but in soft power the EU, thanks to the diversity of the EU’s and its Member 
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States’ activities and policies, has some very good instruments available – from diplomacy to 
political and economic co-operation to various forms of assistance and humanitarian aid (the EU 
is the single biggest humanitarian aid donor in the world).157 Last but not least, what ultimately 
helps the EU is the fact that its foreign policy (if there is one indeed) or the foreign policies of 
the Union’s Member States are more trust-worthy globally than US foreign policy, especially 
thanks to the general EU’s emphasis on multilateralism and international law. And it is the ESDP 
that adds the – still limited but functional - hard power element to the wide range of European 
soft power tools.  
As already said, it is not possible to separate internal and external security – or hard and 
soft security. At the same time, complementarity and combination of hard and soft power 
elements is important for the overall success in foreign and security policy. In this perspective, 
the EU appears to become a universal structure capable of reacting to all types of issues and 
therefore surpassing single-purpose security organisations such as NATO or OSCE.  
To relativize the above description of ESDP and the Union’s ESDP a CFSP 
developments as the only possible and ‘easy’ alternative of further development we must state 
that the concept of Europe as a global player displays a number of inherent contradictions.158 
Moreover, this Union’s aspiration has been undermined by Europeans themselves since they are 
not willing to spend more on defence and to reach unity in foreign policy issues because of 
diverging national interests, namely those of European powers without which no European 
foreign and security policy can be implemented. Apparently, finding a common position on most 
conflicts, such as a humanitarian disaster or civil war in Africa, is not that difficult for EU states. 
This unity, however, will only last before an issue such as the war in Iraq appears which will split 
Europeans into irreconcilable camps once again. Moreover, there is no agreement in Europe on 
the nature of the relationship with the USA and the need for a transatlantic link in defence and 
security, the key concern of this paper. Some states, such as France, go clearly the ‘European 
way.’ Some, such as the new members from post-communist countries or Great Britain, prefer 
the emphasis on NATO and the relation with North America. The rest of the states are not 
willing to choose ‘between Europe and America’. We profess that it will not be possible for 
CFSP and ESDP to develop beyond the currently very limited and restricted form of co-
operation without a common position of EU states on issues such as the war in Iraq, a common 
perception of the role of the United States and a transatlantic link in relation to European and 
global security.  
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 CFSP and ESDP largely fall within the category of European theoretical and institutional 
solutions with no real content,159 with the lack of common interest and the will to advocate it in 
practice. The European Security Strategy is a good illustration of this. The creation of such a 
document which defines common threats and the ways of facing them surely is a step in the right 
direction. But is it really justified to worry about this achievement remaining just on paper 
because Member States are not willing to take some practical steps and measures on the basis of 
this strategy?160  
 
6.2. Where is the ESDP heading? 
 
If ESDP, in its existing limited form, is acceptable for West European actors and does not 
really upset the transatlantic relationship, the future effect it might have on transatlantic relations 
will depend largely on the next steps and priority goals. It is almost impossible to guess the future 
developments of ESDP, just like the European integration, a project sui generis in itself. Yet, we 
may present here three scenarios of the future development of ESDP:161  
 
1. ‘Minimalist Option’ – ESDP will continue to develop within the current framework. ESDP 
will continue to be an autonomous project of EU states which will not dent the role and 
significance of NATO (respecting the three D and shared burden principles), will have fairly 
limited tasks (i.e. Petersberg tasks) which will, after all, be implemented only where there is 
no place for NATO. This scenario reflects the wishes of the USA, Labour-led Great Britain 
and many other EU states, except the ones mentioned in Scenario 2.162
                                                                                                                                                                                    
  
 
2. ESDP as the main pillar of European defence – EU states will be able to achieve an 
autonomous European defence policy which will make NATO politically redundant as the 
Atlantic Alliance will continue to turn around the EU-USA axis. This scenario suits the 
interests of France, Germany (namely the current federal government), Belgium, Greece, and 
Luxembourg.163 
 
 
158 Nivet, B.: La défense : problématiques et dynamiques d’un chantier européen. In: La revue internationale et 
stratégique, No. 48, 2002/2003, p. 100. 
159 Shepherd, A.: The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy: A Policy without Substance. In: European 
Security, No. 1, 2003.  
160 Grevi, 2004. 
161 This is a synthesis of six scenarios presented in Dumoulin, Mathieu, Sarlet, 2003, pp. 724-744. 
162 Radek Khol calls this scenario an optimistic one - Khol (ed.), 2002, p. 69.  
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3. Hard Core Defence Union – ESDP will be developing within its current limited framework 
(Scenario 1) but some states will be seeking more defence integration, wishing for a defence 
union, in an avant-garde hard core – if need be, even outside the EU structures. This scenario 
fits France, in particular.  
 
We can also take into account a scenario of total ESDP failure, for whatever reasons. 
Nevertheless, stopping the project and returning back before 1998, making European defence a 
‘European pillar of NATO’ is, in our view, highly improbable, given its seven years of existence 
and the great political will behind this project. And as we want to turn to the impact of future 
ESDP development on transatlantic relations, the thoughts of future non-existence of ESDP is 
irrelevant to us.  
 
6.3. Future ESDP developments and transatlantic relations  
 
Let us now consider the ways in which the further development of ESDP will influence or 
change the transatlantic relationships, referring to the three scenarios presented above.  
A lot has been written on the ESDP - NATO relationship and its complementarity or 
inevitable antagonism. Yet, it seems that the ESDP-NATO relationship is only secondary here.164 
This is mainly because the complemetarity of today’s ESDP with NATO was provided for by a 
2002 agreement allowing ESDP operations to use NATO planning capacities and to be carried 
out where the US force is not needed and where the USA itself is not willing to intervene, e.g. in 
the Balkans. What is crucial now is the relationship the EU is building now with the USA and 
NATO within the context of the developing European defence policy.165  
A minimalist ESDP as we know it today (Scenario 1) surely cannot be understood as a 
‘Trojan horse’ in NATO as America’s UN ambassador candidate John Bolton remarked.166 The 
question is, however, whether the future development of ESDP, though in a limited form, will 
not necessarily lead to the weakening of the current role of NATO.167 NATO as an organisation 
– and not a defence alliance that must undoubtedly be maintained and is absolutely necessary – is 
a legacy of the Cold War and is largely a ‘service organisation’ for ESDP on the European 
continent, with the exception of Kosovo where NATO troops are still present, because NATO’s 
planning capacities are still irreplaceable for ESDP. NATO’s role as an organisation outside 
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Europe will, however, be also problematic. The United States’ reliance on NATO has been only 
limited and the country has perceived NATO more as a security organisation for Europeans, 
allowing Europeans to take part in US-lead operations (e.g. NATO units in Afghanistan or the 
US request for NATO to get involved in post-war Iraq). Presumably, many European states will, 
however, prefer operations elsewhere than in Europe and – in spite of carrying them out side by 
side with Americans – under the EU rather than the NATO flag, for political reasons or because 
of a greater prestige (brand building) - especially if NATO provides its planning capacities and if 
ESDP remains a project of the whole Union, most members of which are also members of 
NATO, and not just of an EU hard core.168
                                                          
 Increasingly, it appears that NATO as a political 
organisation (and not just a mutual defence alliance) is really losing its raison d’etre, though not in 
practice. It will nevertheless depend on whether the USA recognises the EU as its partner, stops 
discriminating all the time in favour of NATO as against ESDP and allows Europeans to use 
more of the Alliance’s capacities169 to prevent duplication170 while being careful not to undermine 
their attempt to become independent on NATO capacities over time. For this option (basically 
Scenario 2) to become real, it is absolutely crucial and necessary that Americans are willing to co-
operate. This co-operation between the USA and Europe might, however, be threatened by 
overblown (anti-American) ambitions of EU states, namely of France, and the possible formation 
of a ‘hard core’, i.e. a defence union, made up of just a few member states (Scenario 3).  
The very development of the ESDP project, though related to security emancipation of 
Europe and weakening of the political significance of NATO, cannot harm the transatlantic 
relationship in the future, providing some conditions are met, because the very transatlantic 
relationship has undergone some changes.171 In saying this, we disagree with a view presented by 
Jiří Schneider who sees maintaining the present role of NATO (for other than just practical 
reasons) as the only chance for keeping up the transatlantic link and providing for European 
security, whereas he admits that NATO’s position is threatened not only by ESDP but also by 
the US unilateralism and the ‘coalition of the willing’ principle.172 ESDP is a logical step on the 
way of European integration which, however, does not have much chance to really succeed 
without the existence of a transatlantic security relation and co-operation with the USA in 
planning and intelligence. Turning Europe into a military and political rival of the USA should 
not be the (dominant) goal of ESDP. Rather, the aim should be to make – along with some other 
actors – the transatlantic relationship more balanced by Europe taking up more military 
168 Otte, 2002, p. 50.  
169 Van Ham, 2000, p. 227.  
170 In this respect, the complementarity between NATO Response Force (NRF) and EU’s Rapid Reaction Force 
(RRF) still seems problematic.  
171 Andréani, Bertram, Grant, 2001, p.78.  
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responsibility so that the huge military capacity gap between the USA and Europe closes up a 
little. It is this gap that makes Europe and the USA less and less comprehensible to each other in 
security and defence issues (the ‘dialogue of the deaf’) where each of them is choosing different 
methods: soft power versus hard power.173 And it is ESDP that might be the stimulus for Europe 
to put more emphasis on hard power. Let us take as a point of departure the famous thoughts of 
Roberta Kagan in his Power and Weakness in which he claims that ‘Europe is from Venus and 
America is from Mars’ and that this absolute gap between the mentalities of Europe and America 
breaks up the transatlantic relationship since each of these actors ‘speaks a different language.’ In 
the light of this reasoning, it might be possible to claim that it is the ESDP that may ensure that 
Europe is ‘less from Venus and more from Mars’. ESDP and all that is related to it, including the 
European Defence Agency or the building of Europe’s own planning capacities etc., is surely 
improving Europe’s strategic thinking and perhaps allowing for Europe and the USA to ‘speak 
one language’ even though the EU’s interests might vary still more from the American ones.174 
We can illustrate this on US defence industry: the USA and Europe are the two largest producers 
of weapons in the world and their products are of the best technical quality, though the USA is 
still ahead of Europe. The growing European competition in defence industry, which Americans 
are rather worried about now, may very well stimulate further research and development in 
defence industry and help to better equip armies because of reduced prices.175 
  Yet, there are some aspects of ESDP that might harm the transatlantic relationship in the 
future. On the European side, these include an overambitious goal (of France, in fact) of 
transforming Europe into a great power – which is not linked with ESDP only – standing as a 
rival to the United States or ignoring the US legitimate right to take part in a decision-making on 
the security of the whole West, i.e. North America and Europe – all of this spiced up by an anti-
American rhetoric of politicians and anti-American public opinion. ESDP would thus appear as 
the crucial factor in creating a strong defence union which might replace the transatlantic 
relation.176 Given that such visions are unenforceable in the European Union as a whole, they 
would have to get implemented within the above mentioned hard core of the ‘chosen countries’ 
(Scenario 3) which would seriously disturb the building of a balanced EU-USA relationship 
(Scenario 2) as there would be two transatlantic links on the EU side: a tighter and a looser one.  
In general, the transatlantic relationship will not be upset by such ESDP bearing 
European identities in a Europe-wide project; neither will it be harmed by such ESDP which 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
172 Schneider, 2003, p. 2.  
173 Serfaty, 2004, p. 17.  
174 Keohane, 2004. 
175 Grant, C.: Transatlantic Alliances and the Revolution in Military Affairs. In: Ashbourne, A. (ed.).: Europe’s 
Defence Industry – A Transatlantic Future. Centre for European Reform, London 1999, pp. 63-69.  
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would only be the projection of the interests or an extended arm of the big EU states. Many 
might think, however, that this is utopian. 
But many things to do are up to the US. Europeans do not want to give up their ESDP 
and CFSP and if Americans do not recognise these European ambitions or even undermine them 
it will not help the transatlantic relationship either.177 The USA has so far been unable to 
genuinely recognise and accept the European defence and security ambitions (hard power) and the 
fact that the typically European methods, such as the emphasis on soft power, may bring results.  
The current unilateralism and the ‘coalition of the willing’ principle used in the US foreign 
policy is another risk factor threatening the transatlantic relation. American unilateralism does no 
good to the transatlantic relationship because it arouses negative sentiments in Europe about 
America, both on the sides of public opinion and politicians, and because it is principally at odds 
with the idea of a balanced (transatlantic) partnership and dialogue. The ‘coalition of the willing’ 
doctrine contradicts the basic principle of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, i.e. 
seeking a common position of all EU Member States. In CSFP, this principle is acceptable 
through the above mentioned lead nation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
mechanism: some states carry out an operation but they 
are supported by the remaining ones. At a time when the EU is – or is trying hard to be – a 
relatively politically integrated entity, a policy of driving a wedge between EU states can only 
harm the transatlantic relations. 
 If the risks outlined in the above paragraphs do get eliminated ESDP will be of a great 
benefit to the continuation of the transatlantic relation.  
 
176 Bono, 2002, p. 137.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In spite of its short history, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is a successful 
project. At the same time, the present form of ESDP is acceptable to the vast majority of states 
and political actors on both sides of the Atlantic while being in line with the transforming 
transatlantic relation.178 The acceptability of ESDP and its compliance with the transatlantic 
relation are based on a long-term need, expressed at both sides of the Atlantic, for Europe to end 
its security dependence on the USA, to take up the responsibility for what is happening in its 
‘spheres of influence’ to use the old imperial term, and to contribute to the defence of the West. 
Many of this will depend on what direction the future ESDP development will take. 
ESDP may stay within its current limited shape which would be welcomed by Great Britain,179 
the countries of ‘New Europe’ and the United States. According to this scenario, ESDP would 
remain a policy/initiative whose major feature is complementarity (burden sharing) and co-
operation with NATO (confirmed by the 2002 EU-NATO agreement and based on the 
dependence of Europe on the military and planning capacities of NATO), that is in the form of a 
‘European pillar of NATO’ – though one that is more autonomous than the European Security 
and Defence Identity before 1998.  
ESDP, however, may also start evolving in the direction of a truly autonomous European 
defence policy independent of NATO and the USA, as more and more political actors in Europe, 
France and the present German government in particular, wish. And an establishment of a hard 
core or a defence union made up of a few avant-garde EU countries cannot be ruled out either.  
It is quite clear that it is much more than just a ‘division of labour’ between NATO and 
the EU what is going on in the present ESDP. Moreover, the ESDP- NATO relationship seems 
only secondary today: the EU-USA must get into focus instead now.180  
The European Union has been going deeper in political integration while reinforcing its 
CFSP instruments, fully supported by European public opinion. The EU is a political entity 
which should also have a military dimension so as not to be incomplete. As Europe and the 
world in general is more and more interconnected, new security threats, such as terrorism, arms 
proliferation, as well as regional conflicts, have a more even impact on all EU Member states and 
                                                          
178 Scharioth, K.: Making ESDP Strong Will Strengthen NATO and the Transatlantic Partnership. In: Brimmer (ed.), 
2002, p. 165.  
179 Great Britain prefers such concept of ESDP where the ‘EU would be a smart client of NATO’s military services’. 
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no single state can face them alone.181 The European Union also has its own security strategy and 
its constitution, in spite of not having been ratified so far, includes a commitment to mutual 
defence. From a certain perspective, it seems that the EU of the future will be a universal security 
structure, completely in line with the requirements for a comprehensive security policy which is 
needed now, including, for example, the fight against terrorism, with the use of non-military and 
other than force-based means. The European Union of today is described as a civilian power182 
using some considerable soft power instruments, such as diplomacy, global prestige, economic 
power and co-operation, assistance and humanitarian aid. If EU states are able to increase their 
military potential to the required level the EU will have a wide range of soft and hard power 
instruments (as explained in Chapter 2) for its own security and for exerting its influence in the 
world. The global involvement of the EU is made easier by the fact that the Union’s foreign and 
security policy (or the respective policies of EU Member States) evokes more confidence than the 
policy of the United States. This is both due to the legitimacy of a common approach of all 
Member States and due to the greater emphasis put by the EU on international law and 
multilateralism.  
The concept of the European Union as a successful global actor, however, hides some 
contradictions.183 Firstly, it is very hard to reach a common position in foreign and security 
policy: the unity must be achieved among all Member States, first and foremost among the big 
ones without which no European foreign or security initiative is legitimate and can succeed. But 
EU states have no common positions on a number of issues and, sadly for their foreign and 
security policy, these include most of the really crucial matters. EU states are not united on the 
approach to such key issues as the former Soviet Union, Middle East or Far East. Neither can 
they agree on the nature of the future transatlantic relation, the role of NATO in their security 
arrangements, and the direction of the European Foreign and Security Policy, including ESDP. 
The bust-up during the Iraq crisis was a prime example of the combination of the several levels 
of EU divergence: there was no unity in the positions on how to solve the situation in such a 
sensitive and crucial region and no common position on supporting the US ally.  
 The unwillingness to spend more on defence is the second major flaw in Europe’s plans 
of a global involvement and operational defence policy – the US annual defence spending is 
almost twice higher than that of all the EU states together. This unwillingness discredits the 
European ambitions, harming the European defence industry, keeping Europe subordinate to the 
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United States and, in principle, disrupting the transatlantic relationship.184 The still greater gap 
between the military potential of Europe and that of the USA results in a lack of balance and 
mutual distrust: Europe has no confidence in the US solution based on force because it cannot 
fully participate in implementing it while the USA has no confidence in the European peaceful 
solution as Americans do not take part in it. This gap in military operability between Europe and 
the USA was well described by Robert Kagan in his famous essay Power and Weakness.185 In 
claiming that ‘Europe is from Venus and America from Mars’ – though it was the other way 
round before WWII – Kagan transposed this rather simplified distinction onto the level of 
different mentalities: it is not only the potential of using power but rather the willingness to do 
so.186 In the light of this, European ambitions in foreign and security policy seem to be acceptable 
for many actors because they are quite ‘harmless’ due to these crucial structural limits. This idea is 
based on the fact that, due to its general ‘inaptness,’ Europe is left with nothing else then clinging 
to the transatlantic relation and remaining subordinate to the USA.  
But let us now turn to the realms of theory and pies in the sky: let us assume that Europe 
will be able to overcome these limits.  
Given the nature of the security environment today and the changes in the transatlantic 
relation as well as in American foreign and security policy we believe that there is no other way 
for Europe seeking to continue with its integration than to develop an autonomous defence 
policy and overall political and security emancipation even though that will require unity in 
foreign and security policy and higher defence spending.187 
 The need for a truly autonomous European defence policy is closely linked to the quite 
problematic future of NATO as the main pillar so far of European defence and the embodiment 
of the transatlantic security relation.188 Although this relation, mentioned in Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty is not and should not be questioned, the political significance of NATO as an 
organisation has been somewhat fading in the long-term perspective.189 This statement is 
principally opposed by die-hard ‘Atlanticists’ from post-communist countries (this paper refers to 
the work of Jiří Schneider and Michael Žantovský.190 It is true that NATO is still irreplaceable in 
practice: recent ESDP operations have been dependent on NATO capacities. On the political 
level, nevertheless, it is still more difficult for NATO to find its raison d’être. NATO as a purely 
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military organization does not correspond to the current need for comprehensive security which 
would combine hard security with soft security and hard power with soft power. NATO’s future 
role is rather problematic in relation to another two aspects. Besides the very development of 
European political integration, including ESDP, and the establishment of a direct EU-USA 
relationship, it is the recent development of the US foreign and security policy with its weakening 
of interest in Europe, unilateralism, the ‘coalition of the willing’ principle undermining the 
coherence of NATO and turning the alliance into a ‘reservoir’ of potential allies for these 
coalitions.191 Even though Americans, in their rhetoric, still point out the perpetual significance of 
NATO, their recent acts reveal that they do not need NATO as an organisation and will not rely 
on it any longer, as illustrated by the little appreciation by the Bush administration of the 
historically first evocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in reaction to 9/11 attacks.192 
The USA may thus be suspected of favouring NATO as an organisation only because of the 
dominant role they play there.193  
  Given this quite unclear future of NATO, even the present, rather limited form of ESDP 
which is complementary to NATO, seems more and more untenable. The existing ‘division of 
labour’ between the USA, NATO and ESDP is based on the fact that Europeans themselves are 
capable of carrying out only operations they have capacities for and in locations the United States 
and their ‘coalition of the willing’ allies do not wish to intervene in. According to this logic, 
shared with the USA by European ‘Atlanticists,’ it is the USA and its current allies that have 
preference. Then comes NATO (according to the NATO first principle) and only then, when 
neither the USA nor NATO is willing to carry out an operation, comes the EU. First, however, 
comes the consideration of an ESDP in line with the ‘Berlin+’ logic, i.e. the use of NATO 
capacities. It is only then that an operation can be carried out by EU states themselves, according 
to the lead nation principle. In the light of the effort to establish a more balanced relationship 
between the USA and the EU, this logic will get problematic in future. In order for ESDP to 
have some meaning, the EU should not be a 
                                                          
priori sidetracked but should have the possibility to 
carry out operations according to its own interests and not just in ‘allocated’ territories such as 
the Balkans or Africa and for humanitarian purposes only, in line with the Petersberg tasks. For 
this to be changed, Europe must, of course, be able to agree on its interests and specific 
operations while having the adequate military instruments available.  
At the same time, the American (and largely also British) conditions under which ESDP is 
tolerated, the above mentioned ‘3D’, must be relativised: these conditions are somewhat outdated 
191 Schneider, 2003, p. 2.  
192 We might mention here that the American NATO commitment in terms of armed forces is only 8%. Heisbourg, 
F.: Quel rôle mondial pour l’Europe. Paris Conference notes, 18/9/2003 – Europartenaires, p. 3.  
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since they were formulated in 1998, shortly after the ‘political launch’ of ESDP. The Bush 
administration, unlike the Clinton one, is less interested in ESDP and Europe in general. Quite 
paradoxically, the Bush administration is more in favour of ESDP although this is a rather 
‘negative tolerance,’ supported by the weakening interest in Europe. That is why the Bush 
administration has formulated no new conditions which would reflect the ESDP as we know it 
today. We may, nevertheless, assume that these conditions set by the Clinton administration still 
give evidence of the main aspects of the US approach to ESDP. 
The ‘no decoupling’ condition, i.e. no disturbance of the transatlantic relation, is 
politically achievable even in a balanced EU-USA relationship, depending largely on the US 
approach and tolerance of European ambitions (keeping it dependent on NATO) and whether 
these ambitions will be understood as harmful to the transatlantic relationship. The other two 
conditions are more problematic, though: an ESDP accessible for European non-EU members 
of NATO194 (no discrimination) and no duplication. ESDP is a project of the European Union 
which has, so far, been a quite strongly politically integrated entity and which is entitled to have 
its own interests, though it cannot fully define them yet. The participation (as well as decision-
making) of non-EU states in ESDP is, in principle, politically unacceptable, even though the 
number of non-EU members of NATO in Europe will be dropping over time. The no 
duplication condition is very problematic too. Eliminating duplication in military and planning 
capacities is more than reasonable, if just for reasons such of cost reduction etc., yet it must not 
be used as an excuse for blocking the development of European capacities and, in effect, 
maintaining Europe’s subordination.  
The gradual development from the currently limited ESDP to a truly autonomous 
European defence policy is, in our view, absolutely legitimate.195 This development, however, 
should not do harm to the transatlantic relation. Europe should not see a replacement for this 
relation – an a priori rivalry with the USA – in ESDP, nor should it question the crucial role of 
the USA in European security. Also, no small defence union made up of a European ‘hard core’ 
(as many French political actors wish) shall be created in Europe because it would split up 
Europe, could even by formed outside the EU framework and might deform the relationship 
with the USA by establishing several levels of partnership with some states having a closer, some 
looser relationship with the USA. This would undermine the efforts to establish a balanced EU-
USA relationship. In other words, ESDP must be a project of the entire EU, and not just a 
projection of the interests of a few (big) states.  
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The United States, on the other hand, will have to recognise the EU as an entity with the 
right to have its own interests and security methods, such as effective multilateralism and soft 
power, while co-operating with this entity and not seeking to divide it by building ‘coalitions of 
the willing.’ 
The European Union of today is a civilian rather than a military power which makes the 
United States whose current security policy is largely based on pre-emptive wars not rely on and 
co-operate with Europe too much. The military dimension of the European Union, i.e. ESDP 
which stimulates the EU states to spend more on defence and put more emphasis on the hard 
power element of their security policy, can paradoxically draw the security mentalities of Europe 
and the United States closer together. To paraphrase Roberta Kagan, Europe would be ‘less from 
Venus and more from Mars’. Europe could also become a universal security structure complying 
with the current security policy requirements for the combination of hard and soft power.  
And Europe as a global political and military power which will suddenly promote its 
interests in spite of the USA will not necessarily be a threat to Washington.196  
The transatlantic partnership today, fifteen years after the end of the Cold War and two 
years after the Iraq crisis, is at a crossroads. In order to remain alive in the future it has to 
continue to be a real partnership – a dialogue of equal partners, the EU and the USA, none of 
which is dependent on the other – though it has been mainly Europe who has been dependent 
on the USA – and who need one another without quite realising it.197 Europe will presumably not 
acquire quite the same military power as the USA in near future so the alliance with North 
America is and will long remain vital for Europe. The USA is one of the world’s superpowers 
that does not need anyone. But the previously great strength of America, the power of example 
(or soft power),198 is getting lost from its policy. What America needs, as Joseph Nye claims, is 
feedback and correction of its hegemonic temptation.199 And that is why the USA needs Europe, 
its most faithful ally who has the same values and a similar way of thinking.  
 In spite of this all, some geopolitical rivalry and divergence of interests between Europe 
and the USA appear to be inevitable.200 It is a natural consequence of the disappearance of a 
common, unifying threat after the Cold War. Today’s threats – though equally important for 
Europe and America201- do not have this unifying effect of the old Soviet threat.202 
                                                          
196 Layne, 2001, p. 9; Srov. Everts, S., Grant, C.: President Bush: Why You Need the Europeans? Centre for 
European Reform, December 2004.  
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199 Ibid, p. 39. 
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Chapter 2.2). 
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 It is quite natural for Europe and America to have their own, sometimes clashing 
interests. What is important here is that they can find agreement. This, however, might not be 
always possible: internal discord is typical for democratic systems and can be found in the 
relations between democratic countries, too.203 What should be always present in the transatlantic 
partnership though is the effort on both sides to seek dialogue and consensus while realising that 
the variance of views and methods or even competition can be beneficial for both parties and 
might enrich both sides alike.  
Variance is a sign of a mature, balanced relationship which must, however, be 
accompanied by the art of knowing how to deal with and overcome these divergences – though 
through concessions.204 And this art has not disappeared from the transatlantic community 
although it has not been used too much in recent years. Europe and the United States are still a 
community sharing the very basic interests and values, in spite of the variances in some interests 
and methods. 
As stated in the introduction to Europe’s Military Revolution,205 all those concerned with the 
success of European integration must wish for a further-developing ESDP and CFSP. We may 
add that all of those who wish to maintain the Western community in today’s postmodern and 
globalised world206 must protect and ‘nurture’ the transatlantic relation: but not at the cost of 
stagnation and maintaining the status quo, i.e. implementing the European defence policy 
through NATO only, as seen as necessary by e.g. Jiří Schneider,207 but by adapting the alliance to 
new conditions.  
 
What has been described so far is an ideal development which, however, need not 
correspond with reality. This paper presents the reality and author’s ideas in mid-2005 but further 
developments may cast doubt over many of the presented assumptions. Yet, we believe that the 
ESDP project, just like the transatlantic relation, builds on a very firm base and that there are not 
many factors undermining this foundation. Surely, these factors do not include a change in the 
governments of the countries involved, even though the case of Great Britain, a country which is 
crucial for further ESDP development, might be different as a potential Conservative 
government might change Britain’s position on ESDP quite substantially. Not even the failure of 
the European constitution which takes ESDP and the entire CFSP208 a huge step forward, should 
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threaten further development of the project because many of the constitution clauses can be or 
have been introduced into practice even without the constitution itself. What is a real risk, 
however, is that European integration as a whole might be discredited by the constitution (or any 
other similar treaty) not being ratified or a defence hard core (which the constitution includes a 
safeguard against) being established and potentially harming the transatlantic relationship.  
No serious crisis such as the one over Iraq should threaten to damage the transatlantic 
relation: the Iraq crisis was very grave indeed but both the transatlantic partnership and ESDP 
did get over the rupture. Europe has even got ‘used to’ the US unilateralism, which has become a 
typical feature of the US foreign and security policy, and can respond with a common foreign and 
defence policy without disrupting the alliance with the USA.  
 
Let us conclude this paper with a personal observation. Many authors quarrel about 
whether we are living in a unipolar or multipolar world at the dawn of the 21 century. There are 
many signs pointing rather to the unipolar order. We may try, however, to make the whole West, 
and not just the United States, the single world’s pole.209  
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8. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: European Security and Defence Policy in the Light of the 
Transatlantic Relationship 
 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched in 1998. The project builds 
upon the necessity for Europeans – who have depended on the US for security and defence for 
much of the Cold War and post-Cold War period – to take over some of the responsibility for 
their own security and for the building of permanent peace in Europe (‘burden sharing’). The 
emergence of ESDP was stimulated by three factors. (1) The end of the Cold War saw the 
disappearance of a unifying threat to the Western Community and a consequent decrease in the 
US interest in Europe. (2) A change of the security milieu with its new so-called ‘asymmetric 
threats’; and (3) Europe’s incapability to react to ‘hot crises’ in the Balkans in 1990s.  
The ESDP project has already brought some considerable achievements. ESDP has 
become a part of the process of European political integration and EU primary law, having been 
provided with its own structures and institutions. Under ESDP, the EU is creating the Rapid 
Reaction Force and Battle Groups. Moreover, the EU has participated in three military 
operations: two of them in the Balkans (taking over previous NATO missions), with operational 
support from NATO (SHAPE), and one in the Democratic Republic of Congo, largely inspired 
and made a reality by the two ESDP ‘lead nations’ – France and Great Britain.  
Despite these achievements, the ESDP is ‘weakened’ by a relatively low defence spending 
in European states, as compared with the USA, and by internal divisions among European states 
that have been unable to find a consensus on the very objectives and interests in their common 
foreign and security policy. This is most evident in the different concepts of the future role of 
ESDP where there are two competing models: a minimalist one (preferred by the UK and ‘New 
Europe’) versus an ambitious one (preferred by France and Germany).  
 
There are three fundamental questions addressed in this study: Is ESDP necessarily at 
odds with the current or future form of the transatlantic relationship? What could be the future 
shape of ESDP? And what is the future role of NATO? This is particularly germane to the 
development of ESDP (and the whole Europe’s political integration) and to the evolution of the 
transatlantic relationship, most especially in light of America’s recent move toward unilateralism. 
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Key findings:  
 
• ESDP is an acceptable project for all partners in the transatlantic community given the new 
geopolitical reality and also its present, rather limited form which makes it a complement of 
rather than an alternative to NATO. Nevertheless, ESDP cannot remain in the shape it has 
now because it is strongly linked to the process of political integration and is central to 
Europe’s legitimate ambitions to play a more important role in the world. 
• Today’s EU is technically dependent on NATO; in the long term, however, the EU, through 
its ESDP, might become a more universal common foreign and security structure than 
NATO is now. Effective security policy is now seen to require the combined use of both soft 
and hard security and/or soft and hard power policy instruments and strategies.  
• NATO’s future political role is fading: NATO is ‘only’ a military structure; the transatlantic 
relationship should be founded on a balanced EU-US relationship.  
• The development of an autonomous European defence policy is realistic and should not 
cause damage to the transatlantic relationship if the following two conditions are met:  
 
a. The United States should recognise the EU as an equal partner and it should not 
discourage the EU from achieving military capability and operational capacity making it 
independent of the USA in terms of security and defence. The USA should not divide 
Europe by America’s unilateral foreign policy and creation of ‘coalitions of the willing’.  
b. The EU should be more united and spend more on defence, but it should not seek to 
become a rival to the USA and aim to replace the transatlantic relation by ESDP, 
particularly if ESDP would give birth to a ‘hard core’ defence group.  
 
• Europe and the USA might and do have different interests, views, and foreign and security 
methods, but still share some fundamental values, so they both face the same threats.  
• Transatlantic disputes are not something to fear but they should never cast doubt on the 
transatlantic relationship, which is still vital for both Europe and the USA. 
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